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This paper confirms the existence of downward nominal wage rigidity in
Japan as presented in Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a) and quantifies the
extent of this downward nominal wage rigidity by applying econometric
methods to Japanese longitudinal data. Using 1993–98 data, we find that
downward nominal wage rigidity does exist in Japan even after controlling
the individual characteristics and the measurement errors in reported nomi-
nal wages. In addition, we find that the extent of the downward nominal
wage rigidity is sensitive to the choice of wage measures. While the hourly
wages of part-time female employees exhibit almost complete downward
rigidity, the extents of the downward rigidity are limited for the regular
monthly salaries and annual earnings of full-time employees. For example,
our estimates show that the regular monthly salaries of full-time male and
female employees will not be cut as long as the notional wages do not decline
by more than about 7.7 percent and 4.0 percent, respectively. However, when
the notional wage change rates exceed these threshold values, nominal wage
cuts do occur.
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From the late 1990s, many economists have advised that the Bank of Japan should
target a small but positive rather than zero inflation rate to facilitate real wage 
adjustments. Such arguments are based on the idea that since nominal wages are
downwardly rigid, a monetary policy of moderate inflation could “grease the wheels”
of the labor market, assisting the downward flexibility of real wages. 
To examine the validity of this argument, Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a) 
empirically investigate whether or not nominal wages are downwardly rigid in Japan
with 1993–98 longitudinal data. In that paper, we conclude that nominal wage 
rigidity does exist in Japan, but that the extent of the downward rigidity is limited 
for the regular monthly salaries and annual earnings of full-time employees. Those
conclusions are mainly based on the fact that the nominal wage change distributions
are statistically skewed to the right with large spikes near zero, while there are a 
sizable number of negative nominal wage changes.
Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a) adopts widely accepted statistical procedures
from the prior literature to test the downward nominal wage rigidity by examining
the shape of the nominal wage change distributions.
1 However, that approach has 
the following shortcomings. First, as noted in McLaughlin (1994, 2000), the right-
skewness of the nominal wage change distributions may be spurious since it may 
simply be a statistical artifact of mixing heterogeneous groups.
2 Second, it does not
provide us with a quantitative estimate of the extent to which the nominal wages are
downwardly rigid, or indications of when nominal wage cuts will occur.
3 Third, as
pointed out by Akerlof et al. (1996), the interpretation of the right-skewed nominal
wage change distributions may vary depending on the assumptions regarding the
data-generating process of measurement errors in reported nominal wages.
4
To address these shortcomings, in this paper, we apply econometric models to the
same longitudinal data set and check the robustness of the findings in Kuroda and
Yamamoto (2003a). The model used in this paper is a version of the friction model
employed in Altonji and Devereux (1999) and Fehr and Götte (2000). 
Our model assumes that there is an optimal nominal wage that the firm would
like to offer in the absence of downward nominal wage rigidity (the “notional wage”).
Each worker’s notional wage is estimated by controlling the workers’ characteristics
(such as age, tenure, labor market experience, years of education, and occupation)
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1. The previous literature that observes the shape of the nominal wage change distributions and statistically tests
whether or not they are skewed to the right includes McLaughlin (1994, 1999, 2000), Lebow et al. (1995), Kahn
(1997), Card and Hyslop (1997), and Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a).
2. For example, when distributions with different demographic groups are aggregated, the aggregated distribution
could be right-skewed even when the original distributions are all symmetrical. For details, see McLaughlin (1994,
2000). Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a) report that even after controlling the workers’ characteristics, the nominal
wage change distributions still remained skewed to the right.
3. For example, it is difficult to intuitively interpret the extent of the downward nominal wage rigidity based on the
skewness coefficients of the nominal wage distributions.
4. If respondents make any clerical mistakes in filling out their survey forms, or provide incorrect data due to lapses
of memory, such measurement errors may affect the conclusions. For example, if a respondent reports his/her
nominal wage lower than the previous year even though his/her true nominal wage was unchanged, we could fail
to identify downward nominal wage rigidity that actually exists. The possibility of measurement errors is excluded
in Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a).and considering the macroeconomic environment he or she faces. The model expects
that there may be a difference between the notional wage change and the observed
nominal wage change for those samples with negative notional wage changes. More
specifically, it assumes that the nominal wages of all samples with a notional wage
range from a certain negative threshold value to zero will remain unchanged, whereas
the nominal wages with notional wage changes below this threshold will be cut to
some degree. The distance between the threshold and zero point indicates the range
of the downward nominal wage rigidity, i.e., the extent to which the nominal 
wages are downwardly rigid. Moreover, this statistical procedure can account for the 
measurement errors of the reported nominal wages. 
We obtain the following estimation results. First, judging from the analyses 
using 1993–98 data, downward nominal wage rigidity does exist in Japan, even 
after controlling workers’ characteristics and measurement errors. Second, the extent
of the downward nominal wage rigidity is sensitive to the choice of nominal 
wage measures. While the hourly wages of part-time female employees show almost
perfect downward rigidity, the regular monthly salaries and annual earnings of 
full-time males and females show only partial downward rigidity. Third, the estimated
thresholds indicate that the regular monthly wages of full-time male and female
employees will remain unchanged as long as the notional wage change rates range
from –7.7 to zero percent, and from –4.0 to zero percent, respectively. The annual
earnings of full-time males and females remain unchanged as long as the notional
wage change rates remain within –3.5 to zero percent. The hourly wages of 
part-time females remain unchanged whenever the notional wage change rates are
negative.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section II reviews the data used for the
analyses herein. Section III derives and explains the empirical models. Section IV
shows the estimation results. Section V summarizes the contents and presents 
concluding remarks. 
II. Data
A. Data Description, Samples, and Variables
In this paper, we apply econometric models to the same longitudinal data set used 
in Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a). The data source is the 1993–98 waves of the
Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC).
5
In estimating empirical models, we use the following information from the data:
nominal wages, sex, employment status, age, tenure, total years of work experience,
years of education, prefecture of residence, occupation, number of employees at
workplace, and industry. We use the samples who worked at the same firm for two
consecutive years. Those who were self-employed, working in family businesses,
switching jobs, or unemployed are excluded. 
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5. For the detailed information regarding the data, see Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a).We examine five types of nominal wages: (1) the regular monthly salaries
6 of full-
time male employees; (2) the annual earnings of full-time male employees; (3) the
regular monthly salaries of full-time female employees; (4) the annual earnings of
full-time female employees; and (5) the hourly wage of part-time female employees.
7
Since the bonus payments to employees prevailing in Japan are unlike those 
in other countries, the extent of Japanese downward nominal wage rigidity may 
differ substantially depending on whether or not bonus payments are included.
8
Thus, we analyze both regular monthly salaries and annual earnings that include
bonus payments.
9 In addition, since detailed data on working hours are not available,
we do not convert the monthly salaries and annual earnings to an hourly wage basis.
We also divide the samples by sex (male or female) and employment status (full-time
or part-time) because the Japanese labor markets for male, female, and full- and 
part-time employees may well have different characteristics, and because the survey
was conducted solely on females.
10
The number of samples in each nominal wage type are (1) 735 for the regular
monthly salaries of full-time males (1994–98), (2) 1,384 for the annual earnings of
full-time males (1994–97), (3) 557 for the regular monthly salaries of full-time
females (1993–98), (4) 804 samples for the annual earnings of full-time females
(1993–97), and (5) 436 for the hourly wages of part-time females (1993–98).
11,12
B. Data Characteristics: Nominal Wage Change Distributions
Figure 1 shows the nominal wage change distributions for the five types of wages.
The bell-shaped line on each of the histograms shows the normal distribution 
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6. The JPSC only reports monthly salaries including overtime pay. To eliminate the effects of overtime pay 
adjustments from the regular monthly salaries, we only use the samples whose overtime working hours did not
change significantly from the previous year.
7. As for the nominal wage units, the regular monthly salaries are expressed in ¥1,000, the annual earnings are
expressed in ¥10,000, and the hourly wages of part-time employees are expressed in ¥1. We assume that the 
possible effects of rounding errors in reported nominal wages are negligible.
8. Suruga (1987) points out that bonuses account for over 20 percent of Japanese wage flexibility, and that the 
contribution of bonuses to wage adjustment is far more prominent when business performance is poor than when
it is favorable.
9. The annual earnings include overtime pay as well as regular monthly salaries and bonuses. The majority of the
changes in overtime pay reflect quantitative adjustments in the number of overtime working hours. Thus, ideally
we should use annual earnings net of overtime pay to examine downward nominal wage rigidity. However, firms
that reduce their bonus during recessions may well simultaneously reduce overtime working hours as well. If we
only use the annual earnings samples in which overtime working hours did not change significantly from the 
previous year, this could cause some bias in the annual earnings changes. Therefore, in this paper we consider the
changes in annual earnings as the outcome of the overall adjustment of personnel expenses, covering regular
salaries and bonuses payments as well as overtime pay.
10. Because the survey respondents (females) answer wage-related questions both for themselves and for their spouses
(males), the measurement errors in the reported nominal wages may well vary by sex. This is another reason why
we separate males and females in our analyses.
11. The sample for the annual earnings of full-time male and female employees includes employees temporarily
transferred to other companies (shukko), and those who experienced job rotation within the same firm (haiten).
The numbers of such cases are six males and two females for shukko; and 263 males and 108 females for haiten.
12. To eliminate the influence from obvious measurement errors, samples whose wage change rate has an absolute
value of over 100 percent are also excluded. The analyses of the hourly wages of part-time females exclude all
samples below the minimum wage. Also, because some of the male data for 1993 are unusable, the analyses for
male employees are limited to 1994–98. As for the annual earnings, since the survey question asks employees
about their earnings of the past year, there is a one-year time lag for these data. For example, the responses to the
1998 survey indicate the earnings received during 1997. As a result, the annual earnings data are effectively one
year shorter compared with the regular monthly salary and part-time hourly wage data.35
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calculated from the mean and the standard deviation of the data. The small triangle
(∆) located on the horizontal axis slightly above the zero point indicates the median.
All of the histograms seem to be skewed to the right, since there are spikes near
the zero points and the number of samples to the right of these spikes is greater than
the number to the left. This feature is outstanding for the hourly wages of part-time
female employees, where the distribution has an exceptionally large spike near the
zero point and almost no samples at all with negative nominal wage changes. In 
contrast, while the data for the regular monthly salaries and annual earnings do
include a substantial number of samples in the zero spike, they also include a sizable
number of samples with negative nominal wage changes.
If there were absolutely no downward nominal wage rigidity, then the distribution
should exhibit a symmetry on both sides of the median. Thus, the observed 
right-hand skewness can be interpreted as the existence of downward nominal wage
rigidity.
13 It should be noted, however, that the substantial number of samples with
negative nominal wage changes indicates some downward flexibility as well. In the
next section, we proceed to examine these nominal wage change properties more
strictly by estimating friction models.
III. Friction Model and Estimation Method
A. Outline of the Empirical Models 
In this section, we explain the outline of the empirical model. The model assumes
that the notional wages, being derived from the workers’ characteristics such as labor
market experience and number of years of education, do not necessarily match the
observed nominal wages. That is, the nominal wage change rate remains zero as long
as the notional wage change ranges from a certain negative threshold value to zero.
When the notional wage change rates fall below this threshold value, however, the
model allows nominal wage cuts to occur. In this sense, the model exhibits partial
downward nominal wage rigidity, and is therefore called a “friction model.” It is
important to note that the model also exhibits perfect downward nominal wage
rigidity as a special case when the threshold value approaches – , which means that
the nominal wage cuts never occur. We call this case a “Tobit model.” Therefore, the
empirical models to be estimated below nest a perfectly downward nominal wage
rigidity model (the Tobit model) and a model that allows for nominal wage cuts in
certain circumstances (the friction model). 
We expect that these models will consistently describe the nature of the nominal
wage changes observed in Figure 1. As we saw in the figure, there are large zero spikes
and right-skewness in the nominal wage change distributions. These observations 
are consistent with these models in that the nominal wages are right-skewed because
of downward rigidity constraints, although the underlying notional wage changes 
are symmetrical.
13. As stated above, using 1993–98 data, Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a) conclude that downward nominal wage
rigidity does exist, based on the right-skewed nominal wage change distributions.Using the data presented in the previous section, we estimate the friction and
Tobit models using the maximum likelihood (ML) method. Then, we examine
which of these two models more accurately explains the nature of nominal wage
changes in Japan with likelihood ratio tests. If the likelihood ratio tests show that 
the friction model better approximates the data, we conclude that there is partial
downward nominal wage rigidity. Additionally, the size and significance of the 
estimated threshold in the friction model tell us to what extent the nominal wages are 
downwardly rigid (if the threshold is insignificant, we consider the nominal wages
perfectly flexible). On the other hand, if the tests show that the Tobit model applies,
we conclude that there is perfect downward rigidity for the nominal wages. 
Moreover, we consider the possibility of measurement errors in the reported 
nominal wages. The previous literature has discussed how measurement errors in 
longitudinal data could cause severe problems when examining the downward 
rigidity in nominal wages.
For example, McLaughlin (1994) concludes that nominal wages are generally 
flexible based on the observation that a substantial number of negative nominal 
wage change samples exist in the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
Meanwhile, other studies, such as Akerlof et al. (1996), suggest that the frequency of
nominal wage cuts in longitudinal data is an artifact of measurement errors. Akerlof
et al. (1996) conduct a telephone survey in Washington, D.C., and ask respondents
whether they experienced nominal wage cuts during the previous year. They report
that merely 3 percent of the respondents experienced nominal wage cuts, suggesting
strong downward nominal wage rigidity. In short, Akerlof et al. (1996) suggest that
there are a substantial amount of measurement errors in the PSID data, and that
there are almost no instances where true nominal wages actually decline. 
Shea (1997) matches a sample of union workers in the PSID to union wage 
settlements, and concludes that most nominal wage cuts reported in the PSID data
are due to measurement errors.
14 Baker et al. (1994), Altonji and Devereux (1999),
and Wilson (1999) each obtain error-free wage data from the personnel files of large
firms to check how many workers received nominal wage cuts. All conclude that
nominal wage cuts are extremely rare. Altonji and Devereux (1999) and Fehr and
Götte (2000) statistically incorporate measurement errors for the PSID and Swiss
longitudinal data to the aforementioned friction models. They conclude that 
measurement errors have a non-trivial effect on nominal wage change distributions,
15
and that there is fairly strong downward rigidity in both U.S. and Swiss nominal
wages even after taking account of measurement errors. Smith (2000) tries to 
eliminate measurement errors in the responses to the British Household Panel Study
(BHPS) by using information on whether the payslip was checked in reporting pay.
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14. McLaughlin (1999) responds that survey respondents could under-report embarrassing personal information, 
so the survey conducted by Akerlof et al. (1996) has its own type of bias toward undercounting wage cuts. He
also points out the problem with Shea (1997), by stating that the wages of union workers could change without
corresponding changes in union pay scales in the United States, since the union wages are usually assigned to
jobs, and workers regularly move from job to job.
15. For example, Altonji and Devereux (1999) find that 30–50 percent of the variance of nominal wage change is
due to measurement errors. Bound et al. (1994) also report that measurement errors compose approximately 
60 percent of the variance of nominal wage changes.She concludes that the U.K. labor market is highly flexible, with little downward
nominal wage rigidity. 
These papers suggest that the conclusions may vary substantially depending on
whether or not measurement errors are taken into account. If the observed nominal
wage changes are due to measurement errors, the true nominal wages may have even
stronger downward rigidity than the reported nominal wage changes, or possibly no
downward rigidity whatsoever.
16 While the measurement errors cannot be directly
observed from the data itself, we estimate a model that statistically incorporates 
measurement errors with the same approach adopted in Altonji and Devereux (1999).
B. Model Specification and Remarks
1. Models without measurement errors
First, we consider the case where there is no measurement error in the reported nomi-
nal wages. Let wi
* be the log of the notional wage of the individuals (i = 1, . . . , n).
The log of notional wage wi
* is expressed as a function of a vector of explanatory 
variables xi, a parameter  , and a normally distributed error term  i.
i.i.d.
wi
* =  ′xi +  i,   i ∼ N(0,   
2). (1)
Using w ∼
i,−1 as the log of the previous year’s nominal wage and w ∼
i as the log of the 
current nominal wage, the relationship between the notional wage change wi
* − w ∼
i,−1
and the reported nominal wage change w ∼
i − w ∼
i,−1 can be expressed as follows.
wi
* −w ∼
i,−1 if     0 < wi




i − w ∼
i,−1 =  0                     if  −  < wi
* − w ∼




i,−1 +   if            wi
* − w ∼
i,−1 ≤−  . (2)
If the notional wage change ranges from –  to zero percent, then the model 
states that the nominal wage change is zero. The model allows nominal wage cuts 
to occur when the notional wage change is sufficiently negative. The parameter  
determines the extent to which the nominal wage change deviates from the notional
wage change rate when the notional wage change rate falls below –(  × 100) percent.
Then, by substituting equation (1) into equation (2), one can derive the empirical
model to be estimated.
If the estimated parameter   is significantly positive, we consider that as long as
the notional wage change ranges from –(  × 100) to zero percent, nominal wage cuts
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16. There are two possibilities for the relationship between the observed nominal wage change distribution and the
true nominal wage change distribution after adjustment for measurement errors. The first possibility is that a 
portion of the samples forming the zero spike of the observed nominal wage change distribution are located 
further to the left and right of the zero point in the true nominal wage change distribution. In this case, the
extent of downward rigidity of the true nominal wage is weaker than that of the observed nominal wage. The
other possibility is that a portion of the positive and negative samples in the observed wage change distribution
comprises part of the zero spike in the true nominal wage change distribution. In this case, the extent of 
downward rigidity of the true distribution is stronger than that of the observed distribution.do not occur. That is, there exists downward nominal wage rigidity. In addition,
when the parameter   is significantly positive, we recognize the nominal wages as
downwardly rigid in the sense that the observed negative nominal wage change 
rates are still (  × 100) percent higher than the notional ones, even when the
notional wage change falls below the threshold. On the other hand, when   is not
significantly different from zero and   is not positive and significantly different from
zero, we regard the results as evidence of no downward nominal wage rigidity.
2. Models with measurement errors
Next, we consider measurement errors in the reported nominal wages. When the
reported nominal wage has a measurement error ui, the log of the reported nominal
wage wi is expressed by equation (3). 
wi = w ∼
i + ui. (3)
Substituting equation (1) and equation (3) into equation (2), and assuming that
the error term  i and the measurement error ui both independently follow normal
distributions, we can rewrite the model as follows. 
 ′xi +  i − wi,−1 + ui if     0 <  ′xi +  i − wi,−1 + ui,−1, 

wi − wi,−1 =  ui − ui,−1 if  −  <  ′xi +  i − wi,−1 + ui,−1 ≤ 0, 

 ′xi +  i − wi,−1 +   + ui if            ′xi +  i −wi,−1 + ui,−1 ≤−  , 
i.i.d.   
2 0 ( i, ui)′∼N(0,  ),   =() ,  i = 1, . . . ,n. (4) 0    u
2
We can derive the Tobit model as a special case of this model where nominal
wages have perfect downward rigidity by letting   approach infinity.
17
 ′xi +  i − wi,−1 + ui if     0 <  ′xi +  i −wi,−1 + ui,−1, 
wi − wi,−1 = 
ui − ui,−1 if            ′xi +  i − wi,−1 + ui,−1, ≤ 0, 
i.i.d.   
2 0 ( i, ui)′∼N(0,  ),   =() ,  i = 1, . . . ,n. (4′) 0    u
2
3. Remarks on the empirical models
It should be noted that there are several caveats when using the above models. 
First, unobserved heterogeneity may bias the estimates of the coefficients for the x
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17. Aside from equation (4) and equation (4′), we also conducted different types of specifications, such as the case
where the rate of change differs when the nominal wage is decreased or increased and the case whereby there is
some upward rigidity as well. However, we only show the results of equation (4) and equation (4′) in this paper
because the estimation results are believed to be the best, and because we try to maintain compatibility with the
previous literature.variables.
18 Since the models are nonlinear, however, it is difficult to apply standard
methods applicable to the fixed effect models or the random effect models.
19
Second, in the above models the prior year’s nominal wage wi,−1 is assumed to be 
non-stochastic. If it is an endogenous variable, however, we should consider the
endogeneity of wi,−1, and therefore estimate wi,−1 using instrumental variables. Since
we cannot find appropriate instrumental variables, we are unable to do so.
20 Third,
while we do consider the measurement errors in nominal wages, we do not consider
the measurement errors in explanatory variables xi.
21 Properly speaking, we should 
use instrumental variables to omit the bias arising from measurement errors in
explanatory variables. But here again we are unable to find appropriate instrumental
variables, and thus we do not consider the measurement errors in explanatory 
variables xi.
C. Estimation Method
In estimating the friction and Tobit models, we use the simulated maximum 
likelihood (SML) to incorporate measurement errors.
22 Since the models have two
random variables, the error term  i and the measurement error term ui, the likelihood
function becomes complex, and thus it is difficult to estimate the models via the
usual ML. 
In this paper, instead of deriving the likelihood function from equation (4) and
(4′) with the probability density functions of random variables  i and ui, we compute
the likelihood function based on the simulated measurement error ui
m that follows
N(0,  u
2). Although the measurement error ui is not observable, the simulated one ui
m
is observable just like the other variables (such as wi and xi). Therefore, we can reduce
the number of random variables in the likelihood function if we treat ui
m as an
observed variable instead of incorporating ui in the likelihood function. This makes
the calculation of the likelihood function less complicated. Then, by seeking the
parameters ( ,  ,  ,   ,  u) that yield the largest simulated likelihood, we obtain 
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18. In our models, the unobservable heterogeneity for each sample (such as individual abilities and the detailed 
characteristics of the firms where the individuals are employed) is all incorporated in the error term. Therefore, if
these omitted variables have a correlation with the explanatory variable xi, we fail to obtain consistent estimates.
Moreover, because the data set contains multiple observations for the same individuals, it is likely that the
assumption that the variance-covariance matrix is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) no longer holds.
In this case, the efficiency of the estimates declines.
19. It is possible to consider the random effects using the simulated maximum likelihood (SML) estimation 
presented in Lerman and Manski (1981) or the method of simulated moment (MSM) presented in McFadden
(1989). Regardless, as explained below in Section III.C, we do not adopt these methods to consider the random
effects because we apply the SML to estimate the models considering measurement errors. 
20. Altonji and Devereux (1999) replace wi,−1 with its conditional expectation given lagged values of xi (such as xi,−1
and xi,−2). In this paper, we do not follow this technique because these lagged values have a high correlation not
only with the prior wages (wi,−1) but also with the current period’s wages (wi).
21. For example, since the years of education can be regarded as a proxy variable for each individual’s human capital,
this variable contains some measurement errors. In this case, one may lose consistency because the years of 
education may be correlated with the error term via measurement errors. In such a case, appropriate instrumental
variables, which have a correlation with the true value (e.g., human capital) and no correlation with the measure-
ment errors (e.g., the difference between the years of education and human capital), can be used to remove the
bias. For discussions on the consistency and the measurement errors when using proxy variables, see Wickens
(1972), for example.
22. See Gouriéroux and Monfort (1996) and Mariano et al. (2000) for detailed explanations of the SML.the SML estimates for those parameters. See Appendix 1 for details regarding the
estimation method using the SML.
It is important to note that the large zero spikes in the nominal wage change distri-
butions are not consistent with models where the measurement error follows a normal
distribution like equation (4).
23,24 To address this point, we specify that ui is equal to
zero with probability p and equal to a random variable ui
mgenerated from N(0,  u
2) with
probability (1 − p). In other words, we assume that p percent of the samples do not
have the measurement errors, and that the remaining (1 − p) percent of the samples do.
IV. Estimation Results and Interpretation
We now estimate the friction and Tobit models for five types of nominal wages: 
(1) the regular monthly salaries of full-time male employees; (2) the annual earnings
of full-time male employees; (3) the regular monthly salaries of full-time female
employees; (4) the annual earnings of full-time female employees; and (5) the hourly
wages of part-time female employees.
The vector of the explanatory variables, xi, includes the following variables: a con-
stant; age; tenure; tenure squared; labor market experience; labor market experience
squared; years of education; 13 big cities dummy (a value of one for those who live in
Japan’s 13 biggest cities and a value of zero for those who live elsewhere); firm size
dummies (indicating the number of employees at the company where the individual
is employed, assuming those with 1,000 or more employees as the base); industry
dummies (variable based on the industry that the company where the individual 
is employed belongs to, assuming the service industry as the base); occupational
dummies (assuming laborer as the base); year dummies (assuming 1997 as the base);
current profit to sales ratio (by industry and employee scale); the price level by 
prefecture of residence (consumer price index [CPI], overall); and the unemployment
rate by region of residence and sex.
25,26 The descriptive statistics for all of these 
variables are presented in Table 1.
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23. This point was also noted in Altonji and Devereux (1999) and Fehr and Götte (2000).
24. Since ui is normally distributed in our models, it implies that ui − ui,−1 is also normally distributed. This is 
inconsistent with the fact pointed out in Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a) that about 10 to 40 percent of all the
samples show a nominal wage change rate of zero. If all the samples have a measurement error ui that follows a
normal distribution with positive variance, then the probability of zero nominal wage change should be zero. 
25. The age variable is included for xi to account for the annual wage accrual (teisho), which is a distinctive 
characteristic of Japan’s employment practices. 
26. The current profit to sales ratio is sourced from the Tankan Short-Term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan
(Bank of Japan), except for data on firms in the financial and insurance industries, which are sourced from 
the  Financial Statements of Japanese Banks (Bank of Japan) by dividing the current profit by the current 
earnings. The CPI is sourced from Consumer Price Index Annual (Ministry of Public Management, Home
Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications) and adjusted for the April 1997 consumption tax increase. The 
unemployment rate is sourced from the Labour Force Survey (Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs,
Posts and Telecommunications).42 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/AUGUST 2003
Table 1  Descriptive Statistics (Means and Standard Errors)








earnings wages salaries salaries
Nominal wage change (percent) 2.83 (15.00) 3.23 (15.82) 4.05 (14.28) 3.21 (18.58) 2.02 (6.72)
1994 — — — — 6.49 (13.61) 4.33 (18.42) 2.72 (7.74)
1995 2.53 (15.52) 3.19 (17.61) 3.80 (14.41) 2.57 (17.70) 2.18 (6.67)
1996 5.04 (16.01) 3.83 (15.27) 1.78 (12.45) 4.71 (19.75) 2.35 (6.75)
1997 2.92 (14.83) 2.69 (14.50) 3.18 (11.20) 0.65 (18.59) 1.97 (5.79)
1998 1.04 (13.60) — — 2.66 (17.52) — — 1.44 (6.91)
Nominal wage level (¥1,000) 361.2 (125.5) 5,675.4 (2,019.8) 215.6 (  60.2) 3,466.9 (1,081.1) 0.86 (0.32)
Age (years) 36.17 (  5.13) 35.45 (  4.78) 30.45 (  3.76) 30.25 (  3.46) 33.19 (3.63)
Tenure (years) 11.97 (  6.81) 11.78 (  6.38) 7.36 (  4.21) 7.37 (  4.22) 3.16 (2.65)
Labor market experience (years) 15.75 (  5.62) 15.07 (  5.30) 10.26 (  4.05) 10.07 (  3.85) 10.41 (3.64)
Years of education (years) 14.00 (  1.99) 14.02 (  1.99) 13.58 (  1.43) 13.58 (  1.51) 12.82 (1.31)
13 big cities dummy 0.20 (  0.40) 0.22 (  0.42) 0.28 (  0.45) 0.30 (  0.46) 0.21 (0.41)
Firm size dummy 
29 or less 0.28 (  0.45) 0.20 (  0.40) 0.29 (  0.45) 0.23 (  0.42) 0.47 (0.50)
30 to 99 0.17 (  0.38) 0.16 (  0.37) 0.17 (  0.38) 0.16 (  0.36) 0.17 (0.38)
100 to 999 0.31 (  0.46) 0.35 (  0.48) 0.31 (  0.46) 0.32 (  0.47) 0.22 (0.42)
Industry dummy
Construction 0.12 (  0.33) 0.11 (  0.32) 0.11 (  0.31) 0.08 (  0.28) 0.02 (0.13)
Manufacturing 0.29 (  0.45) 0.32 (  0.47) 0.18 (  0.38) 0.19 (  0.39) 0.17 (0.38)
Wholesaling or retailing 0.23 (  0.42) 0.21 (  0.41) 0.18 (  0.38) 0.17 (  0.37) 0.42 (0.49)
Finance, insurance, or real estate 0.08 (  0.28) 0.09 (  0.28) 0.14 (  0.35) 0.17 (  0.38) 0.04 (0.20)
Transportation or telecommunications 0.08 (  0.28) 0.09 (  0.28) 0.02 (  0.15) 0.03 (  0.17) 0.03 (0.16)
Occupation dummy 
Manager 0.06 (  0.24) 0.04 (  0.20) — — 0.00 (  0.06) — —
Expert, engineer, or teacher 0.20 (  0.40) 0.19 (  0.39) 0.23 (  0.42) 0.22 (  0.41) 0.09 (0.29)
Clerical worker 0.34 (  0.47) 0.35 (  0.48) 0.59 (  0.49) 0.59 (  0.49) 0.28 (0.45)
Sales or service worker 0.14 (  0.35) 0.13 (  0.34) 0.11 (  0.31) 0.11 (  0.32) 0.39 (0.49)
Year dummy
1994 — — — — 0.32 (  0.47) 0.32 (  0.47) 0.15 (0.35)
1995 0.23 (  0.42) 0.33 (  0.47) 0.18 (  0.39) 0.27 (  0.45) 0.17 (0.37)
1996 0.24 (  0.43) 0.33 (  0.47) 0.14 (  0.35) 0.21 (  0.41) 0.16 (0.37)
1998 0.28 (  0.43) — — 0.21 (  0.35) — — 0.30 (0.42)
Current profit to sales ratio 0.82 (  6.83) 1.55 (  3.57) 0.59 (  7.54) 1.26 (  3.94) 0.90 (5.94)
CPI by prefecture 104.41 (  4.19) 104.44 (  4.17) 104.37 (  4.42) 104.51 (  4.53) 104.25 (4.16)
Unemployment rate by region and sex 4.26 (  0.89) 3.93 (  0.67) 3.97 (  0.91) 4.11 (  0.71) 4.43 (0.91)
Number of samples 735 1,384 557 804 436
Notes: 1. Figures inside parentheses are standard errors. Nominal wage change is log difference between the current and
the prior year.
2. The base of firm size dummy is 1,000 or more employees, that of industry dummy is service, that of occupation
dummy is laborer, and that of year dummy is 1997.A. Estimation Results
Table 2 presents the estimation results for the five types of nominal wages under 
the friction and Tobit models. In Table 2, we show the results that had the largest 
log likelihood among the five patterns of the percentage of the measurement errors 
in each model (p = 1.0, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2).
27 The shaded columns on each type of
nominal wage in this table denote the larger log likelihood between the friction 
and the Tobit model.
28 The whole estimation results are summarized in Appendix
Tables 1 and 2.
As shown in Table 2, the Tobit model is chosen for the hourly wages of part-time
female employees and the friction model for all other cases. In the friction model, the
estimated threshold value   is positive and statistically significant in all cases. These
results indicate that the hourly wages of part-time female employees have almost 
perfectly downward rigidity, and that both the regular monthly salaries and the
annual earnings for full-time males and females have partial downward rigidity. 
The estimated threshold value   is 0.077 for the regular monthly salaries of 
full-time males, 0.035 for their annual earnings, 0.040 for the regular monthly
salaries of full-time females, and 0.035 for their annual earnings. This indicates that
the threshold of the downward rigidity of regular monthly salaries is –7.7 percent 
for males and –4.0 percent for females, and that of the annual earnings is around
–3.5 percent for both males and females.
29 Most of the estimated parameters for   are
negative, although their significance is statistically low in some cases. This result 
suggests that when the notional wage changes exceed the threshold values, the 
nominal wages will decrease by more than the amount that would be expected based
on the notional wage.
30
Next, we take a look at the percentage of the samples to which measurement errors
were attributed. Table 2 shows p = 0.2 for the regular monthly salaries and annual 
earnings of both male and female full-time employees, and p = 0.8 for the hourly 
wages of part-time female employees. These results suggest that 80 percent of the 
sample for full-time employees and 20 percent of the sample for part-time female
employees have some measurement error. However, the size of the measurement errors
themselves is relatively small. The measurement errors only comprise 0.1 percent of the 
variance of total nominal wage changes for the regular monthly salaries of full-time
males, and at most 5.9 percent for the annual earnings of full-time females.
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27. Properly speaking, the percentage of samples with no measurement errors, p, should be estimated. However,
when we include p in the likelihood function as a parameter, the estimation does not converge. Thus, 
we estimate several models with different p’s (0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0) and choose the one with the largest 
log likelihood. When doing so, we also check the significance of the estimated standard deviation of the 
measurement errors   u.
28. The likelihood ratio test also chooses the shaded columns.
29. It is important to note that the downward rigidity in the annual earnings may reflect not only changes in regular
monthly salaries and bonuses but also quantitative adjustments in overtime working hours. In any event, the
smaller downward rigidity in annual earnings compared with regular monthly salaries is consistent with the
Japanese labor market characteristics whereby labor costs can be flexibly adjusted via adjustments in bonuses and
overtime working hours. 
30. The “probability of wage cuts” and “probability of wage freezes” presented at the bottom of Table 2 and
Appendix Tables 1 and 2 are sample mean values of the probabilities calculated for all the individuals, based on
the estimation results.
31. Following Altonji and Devereux (1999), the variance of the changes in the measurement errors ui − ui,−1 is 
calculated as Var(ui − ui,−1) = 2(1 − p) u
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Table 2  Estimation Results 
[1] Full-Time Male Employees
Regular monthly salaries Annual earnings
Friction model Tobit model Friction model Tobit model
Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value)
Constant 2.466 (  10.65) 2.756 (  14.51) 5.498 (  97.96) 5.800 (126.07)
Age 0.028 (  6.40) 0.022 (  3.89) 0.014 (  4.07) 0.013 (  3.01)
Tenure 0.005 (  1.04) 0.009 (  1.64) –0.003 (–0.83) 0.008 (  1.74)
Tenure squared –0.000 (–0.78) –0.000 (–1.86) 0.000 (  0.47) –0.000 (–0.90)
Labor market experience 0.018 (  3.13) 0.025 (  2.77) 0.037 (  5.63) 0.031 (  3.69)
Labor market experience squared –0.001 (–4.39) –0.001 (–3.25) –0.001 (–5.37) –0.001 (–3.69)
Years of education 0.021 (  3.25) 0.026 (  3.11) 0.025 (  4.77) 0.033 (  5.32)
13 big cities dummy –0.077 (–3.26) –0.041 (–1.41) –0.017 (–0.99) –0.016 (–0.80)
Firm size dummy 
29 or less employees –0.140 (–5.22) –0.150 (–4.54) –0.288 (–12.83) –0.328 (–12.19)
30 to 99 employees –0.152 (–5.27) –0.177 (–4.90) –0.262 (–11.49) –0.301 (–10.65)
100 to 999 employees –0.148 (–6.23) –0.173 (–5.82) –0.200 (–11.17) –0.219 (–10.43)
Industry dummy
Construction –0.021 (–0.66) –0.051 (–1.30) 0.027 (  1.02) 0.013 (  0.40)
Manufacturing –0.034 (–1.31) –0.059 (–1.83) –0.035 (–1.69) –0.038 (–1.59)
Wholesaling or retailing 0.043 (  1.49) –0.022 (–0.62) –0.030 (–1.27) –0.037 (–1.29)
Finance, insurance, or real estate 0.044 (  0.89) 0.002 (  0.03) 0.097 (  2.08) 0.051 (  0.91)
Transportation or telecommunications 0.037 (  0.97) –0.078 (–1.55) –0.086 (–2.90) –0.076 (–2.03)
Occupation dummy 
Manager 0.327 (  7.83) 0.317 (  6.03) 0.273 (  7.31) 0.267 (  6.08)
Expert, engineer, or teacher 0.068 (  2.27) 0.048 (  1.34) 0.143 (  6.41) 0.098 (  3.84)
Clerical worker 0.001 (  0.03) 0.008 (  0.25) 0.109 (  5.20) 0.048 (  1.92)
Sales or service worker –0.097 (–2.87) –0.055 (–1.33) –0.013 (–0.47) –0.045 (–1.40)
Year dummy
1995 0.004 (  0.16) –0.049 (–1.61) –0.052 (–3.03) –0.016 (–0.79)
1996 0.020 (  0.84) –0.002 (–0.08) 0.004 (  0.25) 0.013 (  0.63)
1998 –0.021 (–0.78) –0.026 (–0.79) — — — —
Current profit to sales ratio –0.002 (–1.20) –0.001 (–0.40) 0.003 (  0.75) –0.002 (–0.48)
CPI by prefecture 0.021 (  8.89) 0.017 (  7.52) 0.021 (  16.49) 0.017 (  13.04)
Unemployment rate by region and sex –0.029 (–2.50) –0.007 (–0.48) –0.032 (–2.94) –0.030 (–2.38)
  0.077 (  4.87)   — 0.035 (  5.97)   —
  –0.029 (–1.43) — — –0.027 (–1.70) — —
   0.227 (110.14) 0.205 (  93.70) 0.250 (396.62) 0.205 (110.59)
 u 0.012 (  9.06) 0.118 (  32.35) 0.018 (  13.68) 0.141 (  29.79)
p 0.200 0.800 0.200 0.800
Number of samples 735 735 1,384 1,384
Log likelihood –19.655 –140.605 –154.756 –295.475
Probability of wage cuts (percent) 35.7 0.0 41.4 0.0
Probability of wage freezes (percent) 9.5 50.8 4.0 51.2
Note: The base of firm size dummy is 1,000 or more employees, that of industry dummy is service, that of 
occupation dummy is laborer, and that of year dummy is 1997.45
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Table 2  (continued) 
[2] Full-Time Female Employees
Regular monthly salaries Annual earnings
Friction model Tobit model Friction model Tobit model
Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value)
Constant 3.490 (  49.20) 3.185 (  42.48) 5.559 (  79.73) 5.497 (  96.19)
Age 0.002 (  0.39) 0.005 (  1.09) –0.002 (–0.42) –0.001 (–0.14)
Tenure 0.030 (  3.60) 0.021 (  2.33) 0.023 (  2.72) 0.034 (  3.34)
Tenure squared –0.001 (–1.90) –0.000 (–0.68) –0.000 (–0.40) –0.001 (–1.38)
Labor market experience 0.010 (  0.82) 0.025 (  1.92) –0.010 (–0.79) –0.003 (–0.22)
Labor market experience squared 0.000 (  0.35) –0.001 (–1.60) 0.001 (  1.48) 0.000 (  0.81)
Years of education 0.059 (  7.19) 0.058 (  6.39) 0.059 (  7.64) 0.050 (  5.88)
13 big cities dummy 0.061 (  2.69) 0.049 (  1.96) –0.041 (–1.89) –0.038 (–1.48)
Firm size dummy 
29 or less employees –0.114 (–4.03) –0.095 (–3.10) –0.299 (–10.72) –0.295 (–8.77)
30 to 99 employees –0.028 (–0.88) –0.026 (–0.77) –0.161 (–5.20) –0.142 (–3.92)
100 to 999 employees –0.027 (–1.02) –0.048 (–1.69) –0.131 (–5.37) –0.128 (–4.41)
Industry dummy
Construction –0.034 (–1.00) –0.058 (–1.53) –0.067 (–1.85) –0.082 (–1.93)
Manufacturing –0.071 (–2.33) –0.062 (–1.89) –0.188 (–6.58) –0.105 (–3.07)
Wholesaling or retailing –0.005 (–0.17) –0.006 (–0.18) –0.012 (–0.40) 0.047 (  1.31)
Finance, insurance, or real estate 0.101 (  2.60) 0.086 (  2.03) 0.004 (  0.10) 0.087 (  1.93)
Transportation or telecommunications –0.044 (–0.68) –0.060 (–0.88) –0.122 (–2.17) –0.125 (–1.84)
Occupation dummy 
Manager — — — — –0.375 (–2.50) –0.095 (–0.27)
Expert, engineer, or teacher 0.072 (  1.59) 0.068 (  1.37) 0.072 (  1.73) 0.226 (  4.16)
Clerical worker 0.000 (  0.01) 0.000 (  0.01) –0.011 (–0.29) 0.127 (  2.56)
Sales or service worker 0.037 (  0.74) –0.039 (–0.70) –0.110 (–2.38) –0.045 (–0.75)
Year dummy
1994 –0.004 (–0.13) 0.037 (  1.13) –0.034 (–1.17) –0.012 (–0.36)
1995 0.022 (  0.68) 0.048 (  1.38) –0.009 (–0.32) –0.006 (–0.18)
1996 –0.027 (–0.82) –0.033 (–0.89) 0.050 (  1.70) 0.016 (  0.47)
1998 –0.078 (–2.26) –0.046 (–1.21) — — — —
Current profit to sales ratio 0.003 (  2.05) 0.003 (  1.55) –0.000 (–0.04) 0.005 (  1.14)
CPI by prefecture 0.006 (  3.18) 0.007 (  3.32) 0.018 (  9.22) 0.016 (  7.59)
Unemployment rate by region and sex 0.025 (  1.69) 0.043 (  2.63) –0.004 (–0.28) 0.022 (  1.17)
  0.040 (  3.41)   — 0.035 (  4.05)   —
  –0.031 (–1.74) — — –0.022 (–1.05) — —
   0.206 (169.01) 0.207 (388.17) 0.247 (343.96) 0.206 (  68.73)
 u 0.020 (  2.01) 0.010 (  10.77) 0.013 (  2.24) 0.141 (  37.92)
p 0.200 0.600 0.200 0.800
Number of samples 557 557 804 804
Log likelihood 47.333 –41.419 –71.481 –167.892
Probability of wage cuts (percent) 37.1 0.0 42.4 0.0
Probability of wage freezes (percent) 5.4 48.6 4.1 48.6
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Table 2  (continued) 
[3] Part-Time Female Employees
Hourly wages
Friction model Tobit model
Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value)
Constant –2.612 (–9.56) –2.910 (–14.09)
Age –0.003 (–1.15) –0.005 (–1.70)
Tenure –0.037 (–3.61) –0.018 (–1.93)
Tenure squared 0.003 (  3.55) 0.002 (  2.08)
Labor market experience 0.010 (  0.90) 0.017 (  1.52)
Labor market experience squared –0.000 (–0.44) –0.000 (–0.13)
Years of education 0.038 (  5.42) 0.040 (  5.49)
13 big cities dummy 0.043 (  1.54) 0.045 (  1.67)
Firm size dummy 
29 or less employees –0.120 (–3.87) –0.104 (–3.53)
30 to 99 employees –0.097 (–2.66) –0.117 (–3.33)
100 to 999 employees –0.124 (–3.68) –0.115 (–3.61)
Industry dummy
Construction 0.374 (  5.06) 0.353 (  4.80)
Manufacturing –0.082 (–2.51) –0.082 (–2.55)
Wholesaling or retailing –0.070 (–2.63) –0.106 (–4.10)
Finance, insurance, or real estate –0.070 (–0.90) –0.109 (–1.42)
Transportation or telecommunications 0.032 (  0.52) –0.065 (–1.03)
Occupation dummy 
Expert, engineer, or teacher 0.266 (  6.11) 0.159 (  3.42)
Clerical worker –0.014 (–0.45) 0.046 (  1.49)
Sales or service worker –0.066 (–2.03) 0.044 (  1.36)
Year dummy
1994 –0.024 (–0.72) –0.019 (–0.59)
1995 0.071 (  2.28) 0.040 (  1.34)
1996 0.023 (  0.75) 0.017 (  0.58)
1998 0.039 (  1.28) –0.057 (–1.84)
Current profit to sales ratio 0.000 (  0.02) 0.000 (  0.01)
CPI by prefecture 0.020 (  6.41) 0.021 (  7.54)
Unemployment rate by region and sex 0.002 (  0.10) 0.031 (  2.07)
  0.034 (  6.13)   —
  0.017 (  0.38) — —
   0.188 (  23.50) 0.158 (  71.05)
 u 0.051 (  1.10) 0.034 (  12.73)
p 0.200 0.800
Number of samples 436 436
Log likelihood –34.619 0.976
Probability of wage cuts (percent) 40.7 0.0
Probability of wage freezes (percent) 5.2 51.7
Note: The base of firm size dummy is 1,000 or more employees, that of
industry dummy is service, that of occupation dummy is laborer, 
and that of year dummy is 1997.In Appendix Tables 1 and 2, we see that most of the estimated thresholds   with
measurement errors are smaller than the ones without measurement errors.
Therefore, if we view the result with no measurement errors as a maximum estimate
of  , the possible range of   can be considered 4.2 to 11.9 percent for the regular
monthly salaries of full-time males, 3.5 to 9.6 percent for their annual earnings, 
3.4 to 9.7 percent for regular monthly salaries of full-time females, and 3.5 to 
15.2 percent for their annual earnings.
Figure 2 summarizes the relation between the notional wage change rate (on the
horizontal axis) and the observed nominal wage change rate (on the vertical axis)
based on the estimates for   and   . The thin 45˚ line on each graph indicates 
where these two have the same values. When the notional wage change rate is 
positive, the notional and observed nominal wage change rates are assumed to be
equal. When the notional wage change rate is less than zero, the observed nominal
change rate becomes zero, turns flat, and deviates from the thin 45˚ line.
For the hourly wages of part-time female employees, for which the Tobit 
model was chosen, the nominal wage change rate remains at zero as long as the
notional wage change rate remains non-positive, illustrating perfect downward 
nominal wage rigidity.
For the regular monthly wages of full-time male and female employees, for which
the friction model was chosen, as long as the notional wages do not decline by more
than about 7.7 percent and 4.0 percent, respectively, nominal wage cuts do not
occur. In other words, the downward nominal wage rigidity for these wages exists
within this range (–7.7 to zero percent and –4.0 to zero percent, respectively).
However, when the notional wage change rate falls below this –7.7 percent threshold,
nominal wage cuts occur. Moreover, these nominal wage cuts tend to be greater 
than those indicated by the decline in the notional wage, since the estimated   are
negative. As for annual earnings for both males and females, downward nominal
wage rigidity is observed within a notional wage change rate from –3.5 to zero 
percent. Beyond that level, the nominal wages are cut by a greater degree than that
indicated by the decline in the notional wages. 
Finally, we confirm whether or not the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity
  changes in response to changes in the inflation rate. Even when there is downward
nominal wage rigidity, it may be viewed as a temporary phenomenon if its extent
weakens as the inflation rate decreases. To check this possibility, we assume that the
threshold value is a linear function of the rate of inflation, as −(  +  ′ ) where   is
the inflation rate. Then, we estimate the friction model to see whether the threshold
values for the regular monthly salaries and annual earnings of full-time males change
depending on the inflation rate  .
32
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32. For the inflation rate, we use the CPI by prefecture (adjusted for the April 1997 increase in the consumption tax
rate). Also, we use p = 0.2 for the percentage of samples with no measurement error.48 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/AUGUST 2003
Figure 2  Relation between the Notional Wage Change and the Observed Nominal
Wage Change
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Note: p = 0.2 for the regular monthly
salaries and annual earnings of
both male and female full-time
employees, and p = 0.8 for the
hourly wages of part-time female
employees.
[1] Regular Monthly Salaries of Full-Time
Male Employees
[2] Annual Earnings of Full-Time 
Male Employees
[3] Regular Monthly Salaries of Full-Time
Female Employees
[5] Hourly Wages of Part-Time 
Female Employees
[4] Annual Earnings of Full-Time 
Female EmployeesThe results are shown in Table 3. Table 3 shows no statistical significance for 
any of the estimated parameter values of  ′. This indicates that the threshold values
for the regular monthly salaries and annual earnings do not change along with the
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Table 3  Estimation Results: Test for the Threshold Value  
Regular monthly Annual earnings
salaries of full-time  of full-time
male employees male employees
Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value)
Constant 2.732 (  13.43) 6.156 (171.92)
Age 0.032 (  7.20) 0.007 (  1.99)
Tenure 0.023 (  5.29) –0.000 (–0.04)
Tenure squared –0.001 (–4.90) 0.000 (  1.65)
Labor market experience 0.003 (  0.49) 0.032 (  4.92)
Labor market experience squared –0.000 (–2.03) –0.001 (–4.51)
Years of education 0.006 (  0.85) 0.030 (  5.79)
13 big cities dummy 0.015 (  0.63) –0.047 (–2.78)
Firm size dummy
29 or less employees –0.144 (–5.34) –0.293 (–13.27)
30 to 99 employees –0.139 (–4.78) –0.270 (–12.03)
100 to 999 employees –0.144 (–5.99) –0.200 (–11.39)
Industry dummy
Construction –0.039 (–1.24) –0.003 (–0.12)
Manufacturing –0.047 (–1.79) –0.110 (–5.45)
Wholesaling or retailing –0.000 (–0.00) –0.006 (–0.28)
Finance, insurance, or real estate –0.009 (–0.17) 0.029 (  0.63)
Transportation or telecommunications –0.065 (–1.70) –0.127 (–4.39)
Occupation dummy
Manager 0.349 (  8.30) 0.311 (  8.46)
Expert, engineer, or teacher 0.027 (  0.91) 0.125 (  5.70)
Clerical worker 0.001 (  0.05) 0.067 (  3.22)
Sales or service worker –0.087 (–2.57) –0.102 (–3.85)
Year dummy
1995 –0.014 (–0.55) –0.016 (–0.97)
1996 –0.008 (–0.32) 0.032 (  1.83)
1998 –0.058 (–2.16) ——
Current profit to sales ratio –0.003 (–1.61) –0.003 (–0.76)
CPI by prefecture 0.019 (  8.66) 0.016 (  14.10)
Unemployment rate by region and sex –0.013 (–1.09) –0.001 (–0.07)
  0.023 (  4.47) 0.034 (  5.81)
 ′ 0.007 (  0.71) 0.006 (  0.56)
  –0.030 (–1.52) –0.033 (–2.07)
   0.228 (133.13) 0.245 (536.69)
 u 0.000 (  0.00) 0.017 (  8.34)
Number of samples 735 1,384
Log likelihood –47.985 –151.626
Probability of wage cuts (percent) 41.7 41.2
Probability of wage freezes (percent) 3.1 4.1
Notes: 1. The measurement error considered is (p = 0.2).
2. The base of firm size dummy is 1,000 or more employees, that of industry dummy is service,
that of occupation dummy is laborer, and that of year dummy is 1997.inflation rate. Thus, we confirm that the extent of the downward nominal wage
rigidity obtained in this section does not change, at least for the period examined in
this paper.
33,34
B. Interpreting the Estimation Results
From the above results, we find that nominal wages for the regular monthly salaries
and annual earnings of full-time male and female employees are partially downwardly
rigid.
35 The estimated friction model with measurement errors indicates that the 
regular monthly wages of full-time male and female employees remain unchanged as
long as the notional wage change rates range from –7.7 to zero percent, and –4.0 to
zero  percent, respectively. The annual earnings of full-time males and females remain
unchanged as long as the notional wage change rates range from –3.5 to zero percent. 
How should we interpret these results? Should the estimated extent of the down-
ward rigidity for the regular monthly salaries of full-time males (–7.7 to zero percent) 
be considered “large”? These nominal wages can be taken as “rigid” inasmuch 
as they will not actually be cut unless the notional wages decrease by more than 
7.7 percent. On the contrary, one may also consider them “flexible” since they will
indeed be cut once the notional wage falls by more than 7.7 percent. Similarly, how
should we interpret the downward rigidity of the regular monthly salaries for 
full-time females, which will not be cut unless the notional wage falls by more than
4.0 percent? It is difficult to make any generalized judgments regarding whether the
estimated extent of the downward nominal wage rigidity is “large” or “small.” Thus,
it is instructive to compare our evidence with that found in the previous literature. 
Estimating the same type of friction models with 1971–92 U.S. data, Altonji and
Devereux (1999) show that U.S. nominal wage cuts do not occur unless the notional
wages decrease by more than 65.4 percent.
36 The threshold value of 65.4 percent far
exceeds the results obtained in this paper. Such a direct comparison, however, demands
caution since the prevailing economic conditions during the estimation periods in
their paper differ from ours. For example, the U.S. inflation rate was relatively high
throughout the estimation period covered in their paper. Under such circumstances,
the nominal wages, on average, must have grown at a relatively high rate as well. Under
those conditions, the downward nominal wage rigidity may not have been binding on
the nominal wage setting. If so, their findings may not accurately represent the extent
of downward nominal wage rigidity in the United States.
37
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33. Throughout this analysis period, the inflation rate remained within a low and narrow range from –1.17 to 2.19
percent. Therefore, we cannot deny the possibility that the threshold value   might change under an inflation
rate outside of this range. Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a) examine the correlations between the skewness 
coefficients of nominal wage change distributions and the regional inflation rates. In that paper, we regard the
threshold   as a structural parameter, and examine whether the skewness coefficients of the nominal wage change
distributions would vary in response to changes in the inflation rate. In contrast, the analysis here considers the
possibility that the threshold   may change during periods of low inflation. Therefore, the findings here do not
contradict those in Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a). 
34. In Appendix 2, we report the estimates of  .
35. The partial downward rigidity can be interpreted as indicating that nominal wage cuts will not occur as long as
negative shocks are small, but will occur when such shocks are more substantial. 
36. Altonji and Devereux (1999) estimate the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity by various types of models.
The estimation result presented here for comparison is the one estimated from the model closest to ours. 
37. It is also important to note that the definitions of nominal wages must be comparable when comparing the
results between different countries. The nominal wage used in Altonji and Devereux (1999) is the hourly wageOn the other hand, the analyses of Fehr and Götte (2000) using 1991–98 Swiss
data cover a period of relatively low inflation, at around zero to 4.7 percent, and 
their definition of the nominal wage is basically the same as the annual earnings of 
full-time employees considered in this paper.
38 Therefore, it is useful to compare the
estimation results in Fehr and Götte (2000) with those here. They estimate that the
threshold value is around 30 percent. Compared with the findings here, this suggests
that the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity is considerably smaller in Japan
than it is in Switzerland. 
Another way of evaluating the importance of downward nominal wage rigidity is
to quantify its influence on the economy. Downward nominal wage rigidity may
influence various macroeconomic variables such as unemployment, consumption,
and income. Accordingly, assessing the effects of the estimated downward nominal
wage rigidity on the economy would provide another yardstick for making quantita-
tive interpretations of our findings in this paper, but this approach will have to
remain as an issue for future research.
39
V. Summary and Concluding Remarks
Are Japanese nominal wages downwardly rigid? And if so, to what extent? To answer
these questions, we use 1993–98 longitudinal data from the JPSC, and analyze the
nature of Japanese nominal wage by estimating the friction models employed in
Altonji and Devereux (1999) and Fehr and Götte (2000).
According to our findings, the answer to the first question is yes—Japan does
have downward nominal wage rigidity. This conclusion is consistent with that
reached in Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a), which identifies the downward rigidity
based on examinations of the shape of the nominal wage change distributions. This
paper confirms that the downward nominal wage rigidity does exist even after we
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rate. We assume that both full-time and part-time workers could receive wages on an hourly wage basis in the
United States. Alternatively, hourly wages in Japan are only common for part-time workers, who are mostly
females in the secondary market. Thus, a simple comparison between our estimation results and those in Altonji
and Devereux (1999) may not be appropriate.
38. It should be noted that the data used in Fehr and Götte (2000) has wide-ranging coverage, and includes far more
elderly samples than the data used in this paper. They also estimate the nominal wage rigidities for part-time
workers, and suggest that the downward rigidity of part-time workers’ wages is somewhat smaller than that of
full-time workers.
39. Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b) examine whether downward nominal wage rigidities affect employees’ quit 
decisions using survival analysis. In addition, Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003c) simulate a New-Keynesian macro
model that incorporates downward rigidity, and see how the downward rigidity affects the male unemployment
rate in Japan.
40. As explained in Section II, the data used herein contain a relatively small number of elderly samples. Therefore, 
it is important to note that the findings here may overestimate the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity 
if the seniority wage curve became less steep during the prolonged recession in the late 1990s. Kimura and 
Ueda (2001), however, find more downward nominal wage rigidity among older workers than among younger
workers in their analyses using aggregated data.The answer to the second question—the extent of the downward nominal wage
rigidity—depends on the type of nominal wage. While the hourly wages of part-time
female employees show almost perfect downward rigidity, the regular monthly
salaries and annual earnings of full-time male and female employees show only 
partial downward rigidity.
41,42 The estimated friction model with measurement errors
indicates that the regular monthly wages of full-time male and female employees
remain unchanged as long as the notional wage change rates range from –7.7 to 
zero percent and –4.0 to zero percent, respectively. The annual earnings of full-time
males and females remain unchanged as long as the notional wage change rates range
from –3.5 to zero percent. Thus, the nominal wages of full-time employees are
downwardly rigid within these ranges, but it is still important to note that these
nominal wages will be cut when the notional wages decline beyond these ranges.
Before concluding, we make a few cautionary remarks regarding the findings 
in this paper. This paper examines the existence of downward rigidity in Japanese
nominal wages using longitudinal data during a period of extremely low inflation.
Although such economic conditions are suitable for examining the existence of
downward rigidity, the empirically observed downward wage rigidity could be only
nominal, or both nominal and real. This is because the movements of nominal 
and real wages become more similar under extremely low inflation. In fact, when we
prepare a real wage change distribution based on the data in this paper, we find that
the shape and location of the real wage change distribution are nearly identical to
those of the nominal wage change distribution. Therefore, we cannot exclude the
possibility that the estimated downward nominal wage rigidity in this paper reflects
downward real wage rigidity. 
This distinction between downward nominal wage rigidity and downward 
real wage rigidity has extremely important implications for monetary policy.
43
For example, let us consider the case where the downward wage rigidity exists on a
nominal basis only. Under low inflation, the downward nominal wage rigidity forces
firms to freeze nominal wages that would otherwise be cut, effectively locking 
the firms’ labor costs (real wages) at a high level. When the inflation rate is higher,
negative real wage changes are easily implemented if firms set their nominal wage
growth below the inflation rate. Therefore, when downward wage rigidity exists on 
a nominal basis only, a monetary policy targeting a small but positive rather than 
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41. It is important to note that the conclusions reached herein apply only to employees who continue to work for the
same companies, and do not suggest any downward rigidity in the nominal wages set for newly hired employees.
42. The different conclusions reached for full-time and part-time employees may reflect what has been termed
Japan’s “dual labor markets” with a clear segmentation between full-time and part-time employees. Possible 
reasons for the perfect downward nominal wage rigidity for part-time employees include (1) labor demand 
factors, (2) labor supply factors, and (3) institutional factors. We need to consider the characteristics of part-time
employment, which often requires only general skills. From this, one can understand that (1) firms tend to
reduce their labor costs on part-time employees more flexibly through dismissal rather than wage cuts, and 
(2) part-time employees also tend to move to other firms when wage cuts are offered, because the local external
labor markets are well developed. Under these circumstances, nominal wage cuts are difficult to observe.
Additionally, as noted by Lebow et al. (1995), (3) the minimum wage may also restrict wage flexibility. However,
approximately 88 percent of the samples used in this paper have nominal wages at least 10 percent above the
minimum wage. This lead us to conclude there is very little possibility that the minimum wage is a main factor
causing the perfect downward nominal wage rigidity for the hourly wages of part-time workers.
43. See Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a) for a detailed discussion of this point.zero inflation could facilitate real wage adjustments. In contrast, if the observed 
downward rigidity is due to real wage rigidity, a monetary policy targeting a small but
positive inflation would do nothing to facilitate real wage adjustments since the real
wage itself is downwardly rigid regardless of the inflation rate.
44
Therefore, while this paper shows the existence of downward nominal wage 
rigidity in Japan, one cannot immediately jump to a general conclusion that 
monetary policy should target a small but positive, rather than zero, inflation. The
data used for the analyses herein are all from a period of extremely low inflation, and
thus cannot be used to investigate the existence of downward real wage rigidity.
Accumulation of additional data and further investigations are essential before we 
can draw a general conclusion that would support monetary policy targeting a small
but positive inflation. 
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44. As noted by McLaughlin (1999) and Fares and Hogan (2000), the reasons why there may be downward rigidity
in real wages include that firms may choose not to reduce real wages as posited by efficiency wage theories, and
that the real wage change distribution itself may be skewed due to the skills bias of technological progress.APPENDIX 1: ESTIMATION METHOD: ESTIMATING FRICTION
MODELS USING THE SIMULATED MAXIMUM
LIKELIHOOD 
This appendix presents the application of the SML to the estimation of friction models.
When the likelihood derived from equation (4) has a measurement error of ui, it
can be expressed as shown in equation (A.1):
Li( ,  ,  ,   ,  uwi, wi,−1, xi) 
=∫− 
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Thus, the conditional likelihood on the measurement error of ui becomes
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By substituting equation (A.2) into equation (A.1), and expressing the expected
value of the measurement error as Eu, the likelihood can be expressed as shown in
equation (A.3). 
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45. I(c) is an index function which becomes 1 (0) when the condition c is (is not) met.Li( ,  ,  ,   ,  uwi, wi,−1, xi) 
=∫− 
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The SML uses the simulated likelihood by generating values for the measurement
error ui through the simulation, and replacing the sample mean with the expectation
regarding the measurement error. Using the simulated measurement error ui
m
(m = 1, . . . , M where M is the number of simulations), equation (A.3) can then be
approximated by equation (A.4).
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Hence, with the individual data (i = 1, . . . , n), the simulated likelihood function
becomes as shown in equation (A.5).
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It is known that when n, M →   and √n –– /M → 0, the SML estimates are asymp-
totically equivalent to the maximum likelihood (ML) estimates, so the estimates 
are consistent (see, for example, Lee [1993] and McFadden and Ruud [1994]).
According to Gouriéroux and Monfort (1996), while the SML estimates are inconsis-
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46. In conducting the estimation in this paper, we adopted M = 30.APPENDIX 2: ESTIMATION RESULTS REGARDING THE 
VARIABLES OTHER THAN DOWNWARD 
NOMINAL WAGE RIGIDITY
In this appendix, we report on the estimates of  , i.e., the coefficients of the x variables
in the results.
First, the estimated coefficients on age and years of education are positive, so the
nominal wages rise as these variables increase. Next, in general, the estimated coefficients
of the tenure and labor market experiences are positive and those of the squared terms
of these variables are negative. Thus, these variables have a positive but decreasing effect
on nominal wages. We note, however, that some of the coefficients on tenure and labor
market experiences for the annual earnings of full-time female employees and the hourly
wages of part-time employees show the opposite signs. To examine this, we checked the
marginal influence from tenure and labor market experience. In both cases, we found
that they exerted a positive but decreasing influence on the dependent variable.
47
Next, looking at the 13 big cities dummy coefficients, most of the estimates are
negative, which implies that the notional wage is lower for employees residing in
major urban areas. However, it is likely that the 13 big cities dummy estimates may
not be accurate because of the other regional-based variables, such as the price level
and the unemployment rate. In fact, the sign of the 13 big cities dummy estimates
may change depending on the percentage of measurement errors. 
The coefficients on the price level range from 0.007 to 0.020. Based on these 
estimates, the elasticity of the price level to notional wages is calculated as 0.69 to 
2.19, which is not around the theoretically posited value of 1.00. We infer several 
possibilities for this discrepancy. First, the high correlation between the price level and
the other variables such as those for economic trends and regional characteristics may
produce multicolinearity. Second, the price level by prefecture in the CPI may not 
represent the true price level that workers face. Third, workers’ characteristics may 
not be fully controlled with the explanatory variable xi. To check the first possibility,
we estimate the models excluding several variables (the 13 big cities dummy, the year
dummies, the current profit to sales ratio, and the unemployment rate). The estimated
elasticities of the price level become 0.78 for the regular monthly salaries of full-time
males, 1.71 for the annual earnings of full-time males, 1.35 for the regular monthly
salaries of full-time females, and 1.56 for the annual earnings of full-time females, with
all these figures moving slightly closer to 1.00. For the hourly wages of part-time
females, however, the elasticity remains around 2.00 even after changing the choices of
the explanatory variables. In this regard, our estimates herein may not appropriately
control the female part-time workers’ characteristics. 
Lastly, the coefficients of the scale dummy variables for full-time male and female
employees are larger for their annual earnings than for their regular monthly salaries.
This may be because annual earnings (which include bonus payments) vary more by
firm size, compared with monthly salaries.
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47. The squared terms of tenure and labor market experience are adopted to consider the gradual decrease in the
increase of the wage profiles. However, because the female data used in this paper are for females in their 20s and
30s with relatively short employment histories, they do not include samples of older workers whose wage





























































































p = 1 p = 0.8 p = 0.6 p = 0.4 p = 0.2
Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value)
Constant 1.864 (  6.71) 1.640 (  6.67) 2.976 (  16.90) 3.837 (  55.72) 2.466 (  10.65)
Age 0.019 (  4.16) 0.039 (  8.64) –0.005 (–1.18) 0.015 (  3.42) 0.028 (  6.40)
Tenure 0.011 (  2.38) 0.022 (  4.71) 0.020 (  4.28) 0.000 (  0.02) 0.005 (  1.04)
Tenure squared –0.000 (–1.80) –0.001 (–4.43) –0.001 (–4.09) 0.000 (  0.12) –0.000 (–0.78)
Labor market experience 0.014 (  1.89) –0.040 (–5.24) 0.028 (  3.71) 0.021 (  2.78) 0.018 (  3.13)
Labor market experience squared –0.000 (–1.78) 0.001 (  3.04) –0.000 (–0.69) –0.000 (–2.32) –0.001 (–4.39)
Years of education 0.014 (  2.06) 0.009 (  1.28) 0.050 (  7.04) 0.027 (  3.94) 0.021 (  3.25)
13 big cities dummy –0.094 (–3.79) –0.093 (–3.73) –0.087 (–3.55) 0.019 (  0.85) –0.077 (–3.26)
Firm size dummy (base = 1,000 or more)
29 or less employees –0.108 (–3.78) –0.107 (–3.66) –0.163 (–5.84) –0.116 (–4.24) –0.140 (–5.22)
30 to 99 employees –0.155 (–5.05) –0.135 (–4.28) –0.148 (–4.89) –0.131 (–4.45) –0.152 (–5.27)
100 to 999 employees –0.124 (–4.92) –0.134 (–5.16) –0.153 (–6.17) –0.097 (–3.98) –0.148 (–6.23)
Industry dummy (base = service)
Construction –0.046 (–1.37) 0.054 (  1.57) –0.055 (–1.65) –0.083 (–2.60) –0.021 (–0.66)
Manufacturing –0.089 (–3.21) –0.020 (–0.72) –0.048 (–1.76) –0.032 (–1.19) –0.034 (–1.31)
Wholesaling or retailing –0.136 (–4.48) 0.013 (  0.42) 0.007 (  0.22) –0.049 (–1.66) 0.043 (  1.49)
Finance, insurance, or real estate –0.110 (–2.10) 0.052 (  0.96) 0.161 (  3.10) –0.014 (–0.27) 0.044 (  0.89)
Transportation or telecommunications –0.097 (–2.43) –0.014 (–0.33) –0.035 (–0.90) –0.003 (–0.07) 0.037 (  0.97)
Occupation dummy (base = laborer)
Manager 0.457 (  10.31) 0.416 (  9.05) 0.361 (  8.26) 0.386 (  9.04) 0.327 (  7.83)
Expert, engineer, or teacher 0.114 (  3.56) 0.042 (  1.28) 0.093 (  3.02) 0.114 (  3.80) 0.068 (  2.27)
Clerical worker 0.188 (  6.44) 0.017 (  0.57) –0.065 (–2.24) 0.013 (  0.48) 0.001 (  0.03)
Sales or service worker 0.060 (  1.69) –0.058 (–1.59) –0.094 (–2.67) –0.045 (–1.32) –0.097 (–2.87)
Year dummy (base = 1997)
1995 0.027 (  1.02) –0.028 (–1.05) –0.049 (–1.91) –0.056 (–2.21) 0.004 (  0.16)
1996 –0.048 (–1.87) 0.023 (  0.85) –0.016 (–0.63) –0.047 (–1.88) 0.020 (  0.84)
1998 –0.052 (–1.83) –0.055 (–1.91) –0.003 (–0.12) –0.052 (–1.89) –0.021 (–0.78)
Current profit to sales ratio –0.005 (–2.46) –0.002 (–1.19) –0.002 (–1.00) –0.004 (–2.22) –0.002 (–1.20)
CPI by prefecture 0.027 (  14.06) 0.029 (  18.90) 0.020 (  9.09) 0.009 (  6.40) 0.021 (  8.89)
Unemployment rate by region and sex 0.034 (  2.71) 0.005 (  0.38) –0.014 (–1.10) 0.006 (  0.45) –0.029 (–2.50)
  0.119 (  10.89) 0.049 (  9.78) 0.042 (  8.45) 0.045 (  6.67) 0.077 (  4.87)
  –0.115 (–5.62) –0.008 (–0.38) –0.042 (–2.06) –0.010 (–0.47) –0.029 (–1.43)
   0.240 (113.32) 0.246 (133.25) 0.236 (145.97) 0.226 (127.59) 0.227 (110.14)
 u —— 0.013 (  3.40) 0.028 (  7.13) 0.061 (  5.26) 0.012 (  9.06)
Number of samples 735 735 735 735 735
Log likelihood –248.473 –302.779 –218.461 –117.819 –19.655
Probability of wage cuts (percent) 30.3 41.4 39.1 40.1 35.7
Probability of wage freezes (percent) 13.5 5.8 5.1 5.6 9.5
(Continued on next page)
Appendix Table 1  Estimation Results of the Friction Model











































p = 1 p = 0.8 p = 0.6 p = 0.4 p = 0.2
Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value)
Constant 7.157 (265.35) 4.873 (  62.85) 6.487 (209.15) 6.854 (228.86) 5.498 (  97.96)
Age 0.009 (  2.44) 0.036 (  9.82) 0.011 (  2.97) 0.012 (  3.39) 0.014 (  4.07)
Tenure –0.008 (–2.13) 0.016 (  3.99) 0.017 (  4.36) 0.000 (  0.05) –0.003 (–0.83)
Tenure squared 0.001 (  3.99) –0.001 (–4.37) –0.000 (–2.93) 0.000 (  1.47) 0.000 (  0.47)
Labor market experience 0.008 (  1.16) 0.020 (  3.24) 0.002 (  0.37) 0.006 (  0.96) 0.037 (  5.63)
Labor market experience squared –0.000 (–1.09) –0.001 (–5.38) 0.000 (  0.59) –0.000 (–0.96) –0.001 (–5.37)
Years of education 0.027 (  4.84) 0.015 (  2.93) 0.030 (  5.56) 0.022 (  4.04) 0.025 (  4.77)
13 big cities dummy –0.013 (–0.76) –0.015 (–0.86) –0.054 (–3.11) 0.004 (  0.25) –0.017 (–0.99)
Firm size dummy (base = 1,000 or more)
29 or less employees –0.302 (–13.06) –0.268 (–11.86) –0.234 (–10.25) –0.299 (–13.18) –0.288 (–12.83)
30 to 99 employees –0.271 (–11.54) –0.232 (–10.08) –0.220 (–9.48) –0.278 (–12.05) –0.262 (–11.49)
100 to 999 employees –0.192 (–10.42) –0.197 (–10.95) –0.170 (–9.34) –0.207 (–11.41) –0.200 (–11.17)
Industry dummy (base = service)
Construction 0.124 (  4.64) –0.118 (–4.51) 0.017 (  0.64) –0.004 (–0.15) 0.027 (  1.02)
Manufacturing –0.055 (–2.60) –0.057 (–2.75) –0.021 (–1.00) –0.092 (–4.45) –0.035 (–1.69)
Wholesaling or retailing –0.086 (–3.52) 0.022 (  0.90) –0.040 (–1.64) –0.065 (–2.71) –0.030 (–1.27)
Finance, insurance, or real estate –0.013 (–0.28) 0.139 (  2.98) 0.163 (  3.45) –0.021 (–0.44) 0.097 (  2.08)
Transportation or telecommunications 0.027 (  0.89) –0.013 (–0.42) –0.009 (–0.29) –0.113 (–3.78) –0.086 (–2.90)
Occupation dummy (base = laborer)
Manager 0.379 (  9.86) 0.190 (  5.05) 0.310 (  8.16) 0.324 (  8.60) 0.273 (  7.31)
Expert, engineer, or teacher 0.205 (  8.94) 0.087 (  3.89) 0.161 (  7.11) 0.142 (  6.28) 0.143 (  6.41)
Clerical worker 0.167 (  7.70) 0.005 (  0.25) 0.157 (  7.33) 0.119 (  5.58) 0.109 (  5.20)
Sales or service worker 0.175 (  6.31) –0.131 (–4.82) 0.081 (  2.94) –0.056 (–2.06) –0.013 (–0.47)
Year dummy (base = 1997)
1995 0.038 (  2.14) 0.023 (  1.35) 0.066 (  3.82) 0.018 (  1.04) –0.052 (–3.03)
1996 0.013 (  0.70) 0.029 (  1.61) 0.053 (  2.94) 0.016 (  0.90) 0.004 (  0.25)
Current profit to sales ratio –0.010 (–2.70) –0.003 (–0.99) 0.005 (  1.40) –0.001 (–0.27) 0.003 (  0.75)
CPI by prefecture 0.006 (  6.00) 0.022 (  16.39) 0.011 (  10.52) 0.011 (  10.62) 0.021 (  16.49)
Unemployment rate by region and sex 0.018 (  1.58) –0.015 (–1.38) –0.014 (–1.25) –0.034 (–3.03) –0.032 (–2.94)
  0.096 (  12.83) 0.082 (  11.71) 0.040 (  10.06) 0.044 (  8.39) 0.035 (  5.97)
  –0.040 (–2.62) –0.053 (–3.34) –0.018 (–1.09) 0.007 (  0.41) –0.027 (–1.70)
   0.257 (656.71) 0.251 (287.57) 0.253 (384.40) 0.250 (315.83) 0.250 (396.62)
 u —— 0.059 (  5.74) 0.040 (  4.50) 0.045 (  6.02) 0.018 (  13.68)
Number of samples 1,384 1,384 1,384 1,384 1,384
Log likelihood –483.645 –411.692 –407.275 –288.007 –154.756
Probability of wage cuts (percent) 35.5 36.0 41.3 41.6 41.4
Probability of wage freezes (percent) 10.5 9.2 4.5 5.1 4.0
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p = 1 p = 0.8 p = 0.6 p = 0.4 p = 0.2
Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value)
Constant 3.757 (  51.55) 4.874 (  89.50) 2.847 (  81.31) 3.478 (  48.19) 3.490 (  49.20)
Age –0.015 (–3.15) 0.006 (  1.27) 0.012 (  2.94) 0.006 (  1.25) 0.002 (  0.39)
Tenure –0.007 (–0.82) 0.024 (  2.76) –0.011 (–1.50) 0.031 (  3.62) 0.030 (  3.60)
Tenure squared 0.001 (  2.22) –0.001 (–1.31) 0.002 (  3.74) –0.001 (–2.26) –0.001 (–1.90)
Labor market experience 0.061 (  4.68) –0.015 (–1.23) 0.036 (  5.26) 0.014 (  1.15) 0.010 (  0.82)
Labor market experience squared –0.002 (–2.97) 0.001 (  2.10) –0.002 (–5.16) –0.000 (–0.26) 0.000 (  0.35)
Years of education 0.074 (  8.28) 0.042 (  4.90) 0.054 (  6.77) 0.050 (  6.03) 0.059 (  7.19)
13 big cities dummy 0.082 (  3.38) 0.099 (  4.19) 0.044 (  1.97) 0.093 (  4.07) 0.061 (  2.69)
Firm size dummy (base = 1,000 or more)
29 or less employees –0.111 (–3.67) –0.151 (–5.12) –0.052 (–1.82) –0.115 (–4.01) –0.114 (–4.03)
30 to 99 employees 0.008 (  0.24) –0.097 (–2.97) 0.034 (  1.06) –0.029 (–0.92) –0.028 (–0.88)
100 to 999 employees –0.048 (–1.71) –0.056 (–2.06) –0.017 (–0.64) –0.059 (–2.24) –0.027 (–1.02)
Industry dummy (base = service)
Construction –0.194 (–5.37) –0.065 (–1.84) –0.053 (–1.55) –0.072 (–2.11) –0.034 (–1.00)
Manufacturing –0.123 (–3.77) –0.086 (–2.70) –0.067 (–2.19) –0.084 (–2.71) –0.071 (–2.33)
Wholesaling or retailing –0.082 (–2.50) 0.009 (  0.29) –0.014 (–0.45) –0.015 (–0.48) –0.005 (–0.17)
Finance, insurance, or real estate 0.014 (  0.35) 0.057 (  1.40) 0.158 (  4.03) 0.095 (  2.42) 0.101 (  2.60)
Transportation or telecommunications –0.278 (–4.06) –0.120 (–1.80) 0.007 (  0.10) 0.094 (  1.45) –0.044 (–0.68)
Occupation dummy (base = laborer)
Manager –0.044 (–0.91) 0.062 (  1.32) 0.033 (  0.73) 0.040 (  0.89) 0.072 (  1.59)
Expert, engineer, or teacher 0.005 (  0.13) 0.001 (  0.03) 0.001 (  0.01) 0.001 (  0.03) 0.000 (  0.01)
Clerical worker 0.008 (  0.15) –0.023 (–0.45) –0.102 (–1.93) –0.038 (–0.76) 0.037 (  0.74)
Sales or service worker 0.025 (  0.76) 0.011 (  0.34) 0.106 (  3.34) 0.020 (  0.66) –0.004 (–0.13)
Year dummy (base = 1997)
1995 0.044 (  1.30) –0.010 (–0.29) 0.106 (  3.15) 0.036 (  1.13) 0.022 (  0.68)
1996 –0.022 (–0.61) –0.063 (–1.80) 0.052 (  1.46) –0.065 (–1.90) –0.027 (–0.82)
1997 0.024 (  0.65) –0.085 (–2.36) 0.042 (  1.10) –0.016 (–0.46) –0.078 (–2.26)
Current profit to sales ratio 0.002 (  1.18) 0.001 (  0.74) 0.006 (  3.54) 0.003 (  1.77) 0.003 (  2.05)
CPI by prefecture 0.006 (  3.04) –0.005 (–2.77) 0.010 (  21.79) 0.006 (  3.21) 0.006 (  3.18)
Unemployment rate by region and sex 0.000 (  0.02) 0.056 (  3.67) 0.013 (  1.04) 0.026 (  1.74) 0.025 (  1.69)
  0.097 (  8.32) 0.036 (  7.34) 0.043 (  6.19) 0.034 (  4.49) 0.040 (  3.41)
  –0.008 (–0.33) –0.016 (–0.72) –0.008 (–0.34) –0.013 (–0.55) –0.031 (–1.74)
   0.221 (209.73) 0.215 (285.58) 0.209 (  63.06) 0.209 (205.98) 0.206 (169.01)
 u —— 0.031 (  3.09) 0.006 (  1.63) 0.020 (  5.11) 0.020 (  2.01)
Number of samples 557 557 557 557 557
Log likelihood –113.220 –122.620 –66.323 9.074 47.333
Probability of wage cuts (percent) 32.2 39.0 38.4 38.5 37.1
Probability of wage freezes (percent) 12.1 4.7 5.7 4.6 5.4
(Continued on next page)
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p = 1 p = 0.8 p = 0.6 p = 0.4 p = 0.2
Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value)
Constant 5.138 (  81.31) 5.857 (122.19) 6.327 (216.80) 5.680 (122.42) 5.559 (  79.73)
Age 0.007 (  1.46) 0.004 (  0.77) –0.002 (–0.39) 0.001 (  0.12) –0.002 (–0.42)
Tenure 0.027 (  3.24) 0.043 (  5.03) 0.025 (  2.86) 0.026 (  3.23) 0.023 (  2.72)
Tenure squared –0.000 (–0.68) –0.001 (–2.97) –0.000 (–0.56) –0.000 (–0.64) –0.000 (–0.40)
Labor market experience 0.041 (  3.14) –0.008 (–0.57) 0.016 (  1.21) –0.006 (–0.50) –0.010 (–0.79)
Labor market experience squared –0.002 (–3.35) 0.001 (  1.28) –0.001 (–0.95) 0.000 (  0.66) 0.001 (  1.48)
Years of education 0.054 (  7.21) 0.044 (  5.71) 0.044 (  5.63) 0.036 (  5.00) 0.059 (  7.64)
13 big cities dummy –0.040 (–1.85) 0.008 (  0.37) 0.041 (  1.88) –0.092 (–4.42) –0.041 (–1.89)
Firm size dummy (base = 1,000 or more)
29 or less employees –0.254 (–9.24) –0.268 (–9.47) –0.304 (–10.67) –0.276 (–10.35) –0.299 (–10.72)
30 to 99 employees –0.113 (–3.70) –0.122 (–3.88) –0.162 (–5.15) –0.127 (–4.29) –0.161 (–5.20)
100 to 999 employees –0.105 (–4.37) –0.092 (–3.72) –0.146 (–5.84) –0.107 (–4.58) –0.131 (–5.37)
Industry dummy (base = service)
Construction –0.069 (–1.92) –0.120 (–3.25) –0.074 (–2.00) –0.090 (–2.60) –0.067 (–1.85)
Manufacturing –0.107 (–3.80) –0.132 (–4.55) –0.107 (–3.64) –0.106 (–3.88) –0.188 (–6.58)
Wholesaling or retailing 0.051 (  1.69) –0.108 (–3.48) 0.074 (  2.38) 0.012 (  0.42) –0.012 (–0.40)
Finance, insurance, or real estate 0.159 (  4.13) 0.057 (  1.45) –0.001 (–0.02) 0.119 (  3.19) 0.004 (  0.10)
Transportation or telecommunications –0.000 (–0.00) –0.152 (–2.66) –0.111 (–1.94) –0.137 (–2.55) –0.122 (–2.17)
Occupation dummy (base = laborer)
Manager –0.186 (–1.26) –0.677 (–4.46) –0.474 (–3.10) –0.119 (–0.83) –0.375 (–2.50)
Expert, engineer, or teacher 0.097 (  2.39) 0.129 (  3.08) 0.197 (  4.67) 0.283 (  7.16) 0.072 (  1.73)
Clerical worker –0.012 (–0.33) 0.032 (  0.86) 0.086 (  2.30) 0.230 (  6.55) –0.011 (–0.29)
Sales or service worker –0.150 (–3.31) –0.042 (–0.91) –0.068 (–1.44) 0.079 (  1.80) –0.110 (–2.38)
Year dummy (base = 1997)
1995 –0.053 (–1.88) 0.038 (  1.30) –0.069 (–2.33) –0.019 (–0.68) –0.034 (–1.17)
1996 –0.020 (–0.75) –0.033 (–1.19) –0.026 (–0.93) 0.008 (  0.31) –0.009 (–0.32)
1997 –0.066 (–2.27) –0.079 (–2.65) 0.037 (  1.23) 0.033 (  1.16) 0.050 (  1.70)
Current profit to sales ratio 0.009 (  2.87) 0.002 (  0.54) –0.001 (–0.35) 0.014 (  4.30) –0.000 (–0.04)
CPI by prefecture 0.018 (  9.31) 0.014 (  7.33) 0.011 (  6.50) 0.015 (  8.46) 0.018 (  9.22)
Unemployment rate by region and sex –0.004 (–0.29) –0.001 (–0.07) –0.032 (–2.02) 0.039 (  2.67) –0.004 (–0.28)
  0.152 (  8.93) 0.040 (  7.97) 0.047 (  7.02) 0.066 (  5.66) 0.035 (  4.05)
  –0.218 (–11.08) –0.084 (–4.10) –0.016 (–0.74) –0.071 (–3.31) –0.022 (–1.05)
   0.243 (294.91) 0.250 (238.43) 0.252 (424.91) 0.232 (370.73) 0.247 (343.96)
 u —— 0.011 (  6.18) 0.017 (  6.05) 0.063 (  8.02) 0.013 (  2.24)
Number of samples 804 804 804 804 804
Log likelihood –155.582 –239.231 –189.599 –100.571 –71.481
Probability of wage cuts (percent) 24.5 40.0 41.0 37.0 42.4
Probability of wage freezes (percent) 16.6 4.6 5.4 7.8 4.1
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p = 1 p = 0.8 p = 0.6 p = 0.4 p = 0.2
Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value)
Constant –3.496 (–9.02) –3.989 (–10.96) –2.977 (–9.55) –1.498 (–8.13) –2.612 (–9.56)
Age –0.001 (–0.29) –0.004 (–1.07) –0.015 (–4.64) –0.011 (–3.67) –0.003 (–1.15)
Tenure –0.018 (–1.37) –0.033 (–2.71) –0.078 (–6.95) –0.033 (–3.09) –0.037 (–3.61)
Tenure squared 0.001 (  0.97) 0.003 (  3.11) 0.006 (  6.49) 0.002 (  2.62) 0.003 (  3.55)
Labor market experience 0.012 (  0.84) 0.004 (  0.29) 0.025 (  2.02) 0.005 (  0.51) 0.010 (  0.90)
Labor market experience squared –0.001 (–0.94) 0.000 (  0.56) –0.000 (–0.20) 0.000 (  0.86) –0.000 (–0.44)
Years of education 0.025 (  3.02) 0.049 (  5.99) 0.065 (  7.90) 0.038 (  4.87) 0.038 (  5.42)
13 big cities dummy 0.020 (  0.57) 0.010 (  0.31) 0.002 (  0.08) 0.029 (  1.02) 0.043 (  1.54)
Firm size dummy (base = 1,000 or more)
29 or less employees 0.063 (  1.60) –0.155 (–4.28) –0.178 (–5.27) –0.188 (–5.94) –0.120 (–3.87)
30 to 99 employees 0.078 (  1.68) –0.143 (–3.35) –0.237 (–6.00) –0.159 (–4.24) –0.097 (–2.66)
100 to 999 employees 0.028 (  0.65) –0.147 (–3.73) –0.170 (–4.58) –0.201 (–5.76) –0.124 (–3.68)
Industry dummy (base = service)
Construction 0.419 (  4.53) 0.237 (  2.76) 0.285 (  3.24) 0.326 (  4.28) 0.374 (  5.06)
Manufacturing 0.035 (  0.85) –0.200 (–5.28) –0.083 (–2.33) –0.077 (–2.28) –0.082 (–2.51)
Wholesaling or retailing 0.089 (  2.63) –0.201 (–6.39) –0.168 (–5.73) –0.070 (–2.52) –0.070 (–2.63)
Finance, insurance, or real estate 0.354 (  3.56) –0.140 (–1.53) 0.007 (  0.08) –0.279 (–3.46) –0.070 (–0.90)
Transportation or telecommunications 0.236 (  3.00) –0.662 (–9.27) 0.304 (  4.24) 0.061 (  0.94) 0.032 (  0.52)
Occupation dummy (base = laborer)
Expert, engineer, or teacher 0.316 (  5.75) 0.180 (  3.51) 0.221 (  4.62) 0.271 (  5.99) 0.266 (  6.11)
Clerical worker –0.020 (–0.51) –0.027 (–0.73) –0.026 (–0.75) 0.060 (  1.86) –0.014 (–0.45)
Sales or service worker –0.125 (–3.03) –0.033 (–0.86) 0.049 (  1.35) –0.064 (–1.89) –0.066 (–2.03)
Year dummy (base = 1997)
1994 –0.099 (–2.36) –0.026 (–0.67) 0.005 (  0.14) –0.046 (–1.32) –0.024 (–0.72)
1995 –0.011 (–0.27) 0.039 (  1.06) 0.128 (  3.71) 0.030 (  0.94) 0.071 (  2.28)
1996 –0.114 (–2.94) –0.057 (–1.57) –0.005 (–0.14) –0.025 (–0.79) 0.023 (  0.75)
1997 0.061 (  1.59) –0.048 (–1.32) 0.036 (  1.08) –0.094 (–2.93) 0.039 (  1.28)
Current profit to sales ratio –0.001 (–0.19) –0.000 (–0.12) –0.000 (–0.09) –0.000 (–0.02) 0.000 (  0.02)
CPI by prefecture 0.030 (  7.46) 0.035 (  9.53) 0.024 (  6.80) 0.010 (  3.68) 0.020 (  6.41)
Unemployment rate by region and sex –0.053 (–2.94) –0.033 (–1.95) 0.003 (  0.21) 0.064 (  3.99) 0.002 (  0.10)
  0.182 (  13.71) 0.156 (  12.00) 0.074 (  10.31) 0.080 (  8.12) 0.034 (  6.13)
  –0.009 (–0.20) –0.067 (–1.73) 0.004 (  0.11) –0.023 (–0.76) 0.017 (  0.38)
   0.243 (117.52) 0.226 (154.36) 0.200 (  46.60) 0.201 (  75.60) 0.188 (  23.50)
 u —— 0.000 (  0.00) 0.134 (  3.70) 0.002 (  0.02) 0.051 (  1.10)
Number of samples 436 436 436 436 436
Log likelihood –317.422 –231.620 –228.281 –85.110 –34.619
Probability of wage cuts (percent) 29.0 28.2 37.9 35.0 40.7
Probability of wage freezes (percent) 21.3 19.6 10.2 11.3 5.2
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p = 1 p = 0.8 p = 0.6 p = 0.4 p = 0.2
Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value)
Constant 2.368 (  8.20) 2.756 (  14.51) 2.539 (  10.70) 2.665 (  12.75) 2.677 (  12.16)
Age 0.027 (  4.72) 0.022 (  3.89) 0.023 (  3.95) 0.026 (  4.40) 0.023 (  3.99)
Tenure 0.009 (  1.63) 0.009 (  1.64) 0.008 (  1.45) 0.009 (  1.60) 0.007 (  1.39)
Tenure squared –0.000 (–1.51) –0.000 (–1.86) –0.000 (–1.55) –0.000 (–1.44) –0.000 (–1.46)
Labor market experience 0.017 (  2.29) 0.025 (  2.77) 0.023 (  2.72) 0.022 (  2.49) 0.023 (  2.62)
Labor market experience squared –0.001 (–3.13) –0.001 (–3.25) –0.001 (–3.33) –0.001 (–3.28) –0.001 (–3.11)
Years of education 0.029 (  3.33) 0.026 (  3.11) 0.028 (  3.22) 0.029 (  3.28) 0.028 (  3.11)
13 big cities dummy –0.037 (–1.21) –0.041 (–1.41) –0.042 (–1.43) –0.062 (–2.02) –0.034 (–1.12)
Firm size dummy (base = 1,000 or more)
29 or less employees –0.162 (–4.67) –0.150 (–4.54) –0.143 (–4.24) –0.145 (–4.14) –0.152 (–4.35)
30 to 99 employees –0.181 (–4.86) –0.177 (–4.90) –0.170 (–4.64) –0.201 (–5.18) –0.181 (–4.81)
100 to 999 employees –0.179 (–5.84) –0.173 (–5.82) –0.163 (–5.34) –0.158 (–5.03) –0.172 (–5.50)
Industry dummy (base = service)
Construction –0.055 (–1.33) –0.051 (–1.30) –0.068 (–1.69) –0.048 (–1.15) –0.065 (–1.50)
Manufacturing –0.063 (–1.87) –0.059 (–1.83) –0.070 (–2.11) –0.070 (–2.04) –0.059 (–1.74)
Wholesaling or retailing –0.006 (–0.16) –0.022 (–0.62) –0.013 (–0.34) –0.013 (–0.34) –0.009 (–0.24)
Finance, insurance, or real estate 0.020 (  0.31) 0.002 (  0.03) 0.028 (  0.46) 0.014 (  0.22) 0.008 (  0.13)
Transportation or telecommunications –0.041 (–0.81) –0.078 (–1.55) –0.073 (–1.43) –0.049 (–0.94) –0.051 (–1.00)
Occupation dummy (base = laborer)
Manager 0.340 (  6.32) 0.317 (  6.03) 0.329 (  6.15) 0.326 (  5.95) 0.347 (  6.30)
Expert, engineer, or teacher 0.054 (  1.39) 0.048 (  1.34) 0.043 (  1.17) 0.042 (  1.07) 0.063 (  1.59)
Clerical worker 0.005 (  0.15) 0.008 (  0.25) 0.008 (  0.21) 0.008 (  0.21) 0.010 (  0.26)
Sales or service worker –0.069 (–1.59) –0.055 (–1.33) –0.077 (–1.84) –0.090 (–2.01) –0.083 (–1.86)
Year dummy (base = 1997)
1995 –0.052 (–1.61) –0.049 (–1.61) –0.055 (–1.75) –0.058 (–1.77) –0.055 (–1.68)
1996 –0.008 (–0.24) –0.002 (–0.08) –0.017 (–0.57) –0.017 (–0.53) –0.023 (–0.74)
1998 –0.027 (–0.79) –0.026 (–0.79) –0.035 (–1.06) –0.031 (–0.88) –0.033 (–0.94)
Current profit to sales ratio –0.001 (–0.29) –0.001 (–0.40) 0.000 (  0.09) –0.001 (–0.45) –0.001 (–0.54)
CPI by prefecture 0.020 (  6.71) 0.017 (  7.52) 0.019 (  7.33) 0.017 (  6.59) 0.018 (  6.64)
Unemployment rate by region and sex –0.011 (–0.75) –0.007 (–0.48) –0.006 (–0.41) –0.006 (–0.37) –0.007 (–0.44)
    —   —   —   —   —
  ———— ——————
   0.263 (  89.62) 0.205 (  93.70) 0.224 (155.22) 0.241 (372.97) 0.252 (  72.36)
 u —— 0.118 (  32.35) 0.114 (  33.27) 0.142 (  17.76) 0.198 (  4.04)
Number of samples 735  735 735  735 735
Log likelihood –212.057 –140.605 –166.701 –198.566 –209.000
Probability of wage cuts (percent) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Probability of wage freezes (percent) 56.0 50.8 52.6 53.7 54.7
Appendix Table 2  Estimation Results of the Tobit Model





























































































p = 1 p = 0.8 p = 0.6 p = 0.4 p = 0.2
Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value)
Constant 5.796 (120.40) 5.800 (126.07) 5.818 (127.31) 5.803 (120.51) 5.942 (141.99)
Age 0.011 (  2.68) 0.013 (  3.01) 0.010 (  2.43) 0.011 (  2.65) 0.010 (  2.44)
Tenure 0.008 (  1.79) 0.008 (  1.74) 0.009 (  2.09) 0.009 (  2.08) 0.009 (  2.06)
Tenure squared –0.000 (–0.67) –0.000 (–0.90) –0.000 (–0.84) –0.000 (–0.89) –0.000 (–0.89)
Labor market experience 0.028 (  3.67) 0.031 (  3.69) 0.029 (  3.73) 0.029 (  3.69) 0.029 (  3.81)
Labor market experience squared –0.001 (–3.37) –0.001 (–3.69) –0.001 (–3.71) –0.001 (–3.45) –0.001 (–3.56)
Years of education 0.036 (  5.75) 0.033 (  5.32) 0.037 (  5.98) 0.034 (  5.38) 0.036 (  5.82)
13 big cities dummy –0.018 (–0.86) –0.016 (–0.80) –0.014 (–0.68) –0.029 (–1.40) –0.024 (–1.19)
Firm size dummy (base = 1,000 or more)
29 or less employees –0.313 (–11.75) –0.328 (–12.19) –0.299 (–11.07) –0.297 (–10.78) –0.311 (–11.59)
30 to 99 employees –0.291 (–10.63) –0.301 (–10.65) –0.289 (–10.30) –0.274 (–9.83) –0.292 (–10.64)
100 to 999 employees –0.202 (–9.66) –0.219 (–10.43) –0.211 (–9.97) –0.188 (–8.79) –0.205 (–9.79)
Industry dummy (base = service)
Construction –0.012 (–0.37) 0.013 (  0.40) 0.024 (  0.77) 0.014 (  0.44) 0.010 (  0.31)
Manufacturing –0.059 (–2.42) –0.038 (–1.59) –0.050 (–2.06) –0.040 (–1.63) –0.047 (–1.93)
Wholesaling or retailing –0.037 (–1.30) –0.037 (–1.29) –0.032 (–1.11) –0.032 (–1.10) –0.045 (–1.59)
Finance, insurance, or real estate 0.080 (  1.48) 0.051 (  0.91) 0.052 (  0.93) 0.052 (  0.93) 0.027 (  0.48)
Transportation or telecommunications –0.079 (–2.24) –0.076 (–2.03) –0.061 (–1.66) –0.077 (–2.15) –0.083 (–2.33)
Occupation dummy (base = laborer)
Manager 0.268 (  5.93) 0.267 (  6.08) 0.264 (  6.03) 0.239 (  5.21) 0.265 (  5.90)
Expert, engineer, or teacher 0.115 (  4.37) 0.098 (  3.84) 0.107 (  4.15) 0.099 (  3.78) 0.124 (  4.79)
Clerical worker 0.076 (  3.05) 0.048 (  1.92) 0.071 (  2.83) 0.075 (  2.95) 0.079 (  3.16)
Sales or service worker –0.055 (–1.70) –0.045 (–1.40) –0.040 (–1.26) –0.044 (–1.34) –0.039 (–1.19)
Year dummy (base = 1997)
1995 –0.002 (–0.09) –0.016 (–0.79) –0.017 (–0.84) –0.016 (–0.78) –0.008 (–0.39)
1996 0.013 (  0.61) 0.013 (  0.63) 0.012 (  0.57) 0.018 (  0.84) 0.015 (  0.72)
Current profit to sales ratio 0.000 (  0.07) –0.002 (–0.48) –0.001 (–0.29) –0.001 (–0.21) –0.002 (–0.46)
CPI by prefecture 0.017 (  12.57) 0.017 (  13.04) 0.018 (  13.26) 0.017 (  12.49) 0.016 (  11.93)
Unemployment rate by region and sex –0.039 (–3.02) –0.030 (–2.38) –0.048 (–3.73) –0.031 (–2.36) –0.031 (–2.44)
    —   —   —   —   —
  ———— ——————
   0.267 (473.31) 0.205 (110.59) 0.229 (  89.44) 0.239 (102.54) 0.254 (229.65)
 u —— 0.141 (  29.79) 0.126 (  20.98) 0.184 (  12.76) 0.146 (  27.19)
Number of samples 1,384 1,384 1,384 1,384 1,384
Log likelihood –402.081 –295.475 –336.708 –364.744 –384.601
Probability of wage cuts (percent) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Probability of wage freezes (percent) 55.0 51.2 53.0 53.3 54.5
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p = 1 p = 0.8 p = 0.6 p = 0.4 p = 0.2
Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value)
Constant 2.841 (  32.66) 3.188 (  40.83) 3.185 (  42.48) 3.001 (  36.21) 2.985 (  33.53)
Age 0.006 (  1.08) 0.005 (  0.92) 0.005 (  1.09) 0.004 (  0.84) 0.004 (  0.73)
Tenure 0.015 (  1.52) 0.021 (  2.24) 0.021 (  2.33) 0.020 (  2.12) 0.019 (  2.00)
Tenure squared 0.000 (  0.25) –0.000 (–0.35) –0.000 (–0.68) –0.000 (–0.71) –0.000 (–0.74)
Labor market experience 0.042 (  3.06) 0.027 (  2.00) 0.025 (  1.92) 0.030 (  2.26) 0.028 (  2.02)
Labor market experience squared –0.002 (–2.98) –0.001 (–1.96) –0.001 (–1.60) –0.001 (–1.65) –0.001 (–1.43)
Years of education 0.059 (  6.20) 0.055 (  5.86) 0.058 (  6.39) 0.064 (  6.95) 0.064 (  6.52)
13 big cities dummy 0.039 (  1.49) 0.043 (  1.63) 0.049 (  1.96) 0.042 (  1.66) 0.046 (  1.72)
Firm size dummy (base = 1,000 or more)
29 or less employees –0.098 (–3.04) –0.113 (–3.45) –0.095 (–3.10) –0.099 (–3.18) –0.111 (–3.43)
30 to 99 employees –0.002 (–0.05) –0.024 (–0.68) –0.026 (–0.77) –0.034 (–0.98) –0.026 (–0.72)
100 to 999 employees –0.039 (–1.31) –0.059 (–2.01) –0.048 (–1.69) –0.056 (–1.96) –0.056 (–1.87)
Industry dummy (base = service)
Construction –0.078 (–1.95) –0.049 (–1.21) –0.058 (–1.53) –0.056 (–1.47) –0.052 (–1.29)
Manufacturing –0.083 (–2.37) –0.054 (–1.62) –0.062 (–1.89) –0.066 (–1.97) –0.064 (–1.81)
Wholesaling or retailing –0.016 (–0.46) –0.006 (–0.16) –0.006 (–0.18) –0.005 (–0.14) –0.005 (–0.15)
Finance, insurance, or real estate 0.074 (  1.65) 0.066 (  1.50) 0.086 (  2.03) 0.110 (  2.56) 0.089 (  2.01)
Transportation or telecommunications –0.063 (–0.86) –0.040 (–0.55) –0.060 (–0.88) –0.061 (–0.87) –0.085 (–1.20)
Occupation dummy (base = laborer)
Manager 0.057 (  1.10) 0.062 (  1.20) 0.068 (  1.37) 0.053 (  1.05) 0.056 (  1.04)
Expert, engineer, or teacher 0.000 (  0.00) 0.000 (  0.01) 0.000 (  0.01) 0.001 (  0.01) 0.001 (  0.01)
Clerical worker –0.053 (–0.90) –0.078 (–1.31) –0.039 (–0.70) –0.047 (–0.84) –0.048 (–0.80)
Sales or service worker 0.036 (  1.06) 0.028 (  0.81) 0.037 (  1.13) 0.049 (  1.47) 0.036 (  1.04)
Year dummy (base = 1997)
1995 0.049 (  1.36) 0.061 (  1.66) 0.048 (  1.38) 0.068 (  1.94) 0.052 (  1.43)
1996 –0.031 (–0.80) –0.023 (–0.59) –0.033 (–0.89) –0.020 (–0.54) –0.032 (–0.81)
1997 –0.044 (–1.09) –0.036 (–0.88) –0.046 (–1.21) –0.030 (–0.78) –0.037 (–0.90)
Current profit to sales ratio 0.003 (  1.35) 0.003 (  1.58) 0.003 (  1.55) 0.003 (  1.75) 0.003 (  1.49)
CPI by prefecture 0.010 (  4.19) 0.008 (  3.55) 0.007 (  3.32) 0.008 (  3.61) 0.009 (  3.77)
Unemployment rate by region and sex 0.036 (  2.09) 0.041 (  2.47) 0.043 (  2.63) 0.043 (  2.60) 0.035 (  2.02)
    —   —   —   —   —
  ———— ——————
   0.217 (144.54) 0.173 (  46.92) 0.207 (388.17) 0.210 (269.42) 0.210 (571.98)
 u —— 0.122 (  19.47) 0.010 (  10.77) 0.014 (  9.70) 0.129 (  21.21)
Number of samples 557 557  557  557 557
Log likelihood –74.682 –43.295 –41.419 –52.689 –70.647
Probability of wage cuts (percent) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Probability of wage freezes (percent) 50.8 46.7 48.6 49.4 50.0
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p = 1 p = 0.8 p = 0.6 p = 0.4 p = 0.2
Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value)
Constant 5.432 (  75.68) 5.497 (  96.19) 5.496 (  80.92) 5.571 (  91.24) 5.454 (  74.99)
Age 0.000 (  0.07) –0.001 (–0.14) 0.001 (  0.14) –0.000 (–0.05) 0.000 (  0.06)
Tenure 0.036 (  3.70) 0.034 (  3.34) 0.030 (  3.08) 0.030 (  3.04) 0.029 (  3.02)
Tenure squared –0.001 (–1.85) –0.001 (–1.38) –0.001 (–1.10) –0.001 (–0.93) –0.001 (–1.06)
Labor market experience –0.003 (–0.19) –0.003 (–0.22) –0.003 (–0.22) –0.003 (–0.22) –0.003 (–0.21)
Labor market experience squared 0.001 (  0.85) 0.000 (  0.81) 0.000 (  0.73) 0.000 (  0.58) 0.000 (  0.75)
Years of education 0.042 (  4.88) 0.050 (  5.88) 0.042 (  4.95) 0.042 (  4.89) 0.042 (  4.94)
13 big cities dummy –0.044 (–1.74) –0.038 (–1.48) –0.048 (–1.91) –0.044 (–1.72) –0.034 (–1.36)
Firm size dummy (base = 1,000 or more)
29 or less employees –0.292 (–9.07) –0.295 (–8.77) –0.281 (–8.71) –0.280 (–8.50) –0.277 (–8.59)
30 to 99 employees –0.173 (–4.75) –0.142 (–3.92) –0.169 (–4.68) –0.135 (–3.69) –0.160 (–4.41)
100 to 999 employees –0.159 (–5.61) –0.128 (–4.41) –0.142 (–5.04) –0.123 (–4.26) –0.137 (–4.84)
Industry dummy (base = service)
Construction –0.083 (–1.99) –0.082 (–1.93) –0.074 (–1.74) –0.082 (–1.89) –0.077 (–1.82)
Manufacturing –0.118 (–3.60) –0.105 (–3.07) –0.096 (–2.95) –0.102 (–3.08) –0.096 (–2.94)
Wholesaling or retailing 0.027 (  0.78) 0.047 (  1.31) 0.027 (  0.78) 0.043 (  1.21) 0.037 (  1.04)
Finance, insurance, or real estate 0.021 (  0.47) 0.087 (  1.93) 0.062 (  1.40) 0.098 (  2.18) 0.054 (  1.19)
Transportation or telecommunications –0.196 (–2.79) –0.125 (–1.84) –0.135 (–1.95) –0.164 (–2.34) –0.181 (–2.54)
Occupation dummy (base = laborer)
Manager –0.421 (–1.03) –0.095 (–0.27) –0.114 (–0.42) –0.192 (–0.59) –0.151 (–0.52)
Expert, engineer, or teacher 0.146 (  3.07) 0.226 (  4.16) 0.185 (  3.92) 0.193 (  3.86) 0.187 (  3.90)
Clerical worker 0.067 (  1.57) 0.127 (  2.56) 0.084 (  1.99) 0.095 (  2.11) 0.094 (  2.20)
Sales or service worker –0.048 (–0.90) –0.045 (–0.75) –0.030 (–0.56) –0.032 (–0.58) –0.016 (–0.31)
Year dummy (base = 1997)
1995 0.007 (  0.20) –0.012 (–0.36) –0.017 (–0.49) –0.019 (–0.57) –0.027 (–0.82)
1996 0.010 (  0.33) –0.006 (–0.18) –0.005 (–0.14) –0.005 (–0.14) –0.004 (–0.11)
1997 0.057 (  1.67) 0.016 (  0.47) 0.019 (  0.57) 0.013 (  0.38) 0.016 (  0.46)
Current profit to sales ratio 0.000 (  0.06) 0.005 (  1.14) 0.003 (  0.83) 0.006 (  1.40) 0.003 (  0.80)
CPI by prefecture 0.017 (  7.91) 0.016 (  7.59) 0.017 (  8.03) 0.016 (  7.91) 0.018 (  8.07)
Unemployment rate by region and sex 0.027 (  1.52) 0.022 (  1.17) 0.017 (  0.96) 0.020 (  1.09) 0.016 (  0.87)
    —   —   —   —   —
  ———— ——————
   0.260 (672.87) 0.206 (  68.73) 0.239 (128.12) 0.232 (  84.60) 0.249 (223.38)
 u —— 0.141 (  37.92) 0.103 (  19.93) 0.102 (  24.34) 0.141 (  17.57)
Number of samples 804 804 804 804 804
Log likelihood –217.086 –167.892 –191.188 –183.311 –205.597
Probability of wage cuts (percent) 0.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Probability of wage freezes (percent) 52.8 48.6 51.2 50.6 51.6
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p = 1 p = 0.8 p = 0.6 p = 0.4 p = 0.2
Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value)
Constant –2.893 (–9.62) –2.910 (–14.09) –2.751 (–10.93) –2.957 (–10.61) –2.823 (–10.15)
Age –0.008 (–1.93) –0.005 (–1.70) –0.006 (–1.82) –0.007 (–2.03) –0.006 (–1.70)
Tenure –0.038 (–2.67) –0.018 (–1.93) –0.025 (–2.35) –0.019 (–1.61) –0.021 (–1.62)
Tenure squared 0.002 (  2.21) 0.002 (  2.08) 0.001 (  1.75) 0.001 (  1.54) 0.001 (  1.45)
Labor market experience 0.016 (  1.06) 0.017 (  1.52) 0.019 (  1.60) 0.019 (  1.47) 0.017 (  1.22)
Labor market experience squared 0.000 (  0.24) –0.000 (–0.13) –0.000 (–0.03) –0.000 (–0.04) –0.000 (–0.04)
Years of education 0.045 (  4.34) 0.040 (  5.49) 0.031 (  3.97) 0.037 (  4.27) 0.038 (  3.98)
13 big cities dummy 0.080 (  2.12) 0.045 (  1.67) 0.057 (  1.91) 0.047 (  1.41) 0.073 (  2.09)
Firm size dummy (base = 1,000 or more)
29 or less employees –0.150 (–3.56) –0.104 (–3.53) –0.080 (–2.43) –0.073 (–2.00) –0.118 (–2.97)
30 to 99 employees –0.204 (–3.99) –0.117 (–3.33) –0.129 (–3.25) –0.108 (–2.48) –0.152 (–3.22)
100 to 999 employees –0.146 (–3.14) –0.115 (–3.61) –0.083 (–2.31) –0.082 (–2.07) –0.089 (–2.04)
Industry dummy (base = service)
Construction 0.447 (  4.70) 0.353 (  4.80) 0.311 (  3.87) 0.376 (  4.65) 0.431 (  4.98)
Manufacturing –0.008 (–0.17) –0.082 (–2.55) –0.080 (–2.27) –0.069 (–1.78) –0.048 (–1.14)
Wholesaling or retailing –0.056 (–1.44) –0.106 (–4.10) –0.103 (–3.55) –0.101 (–3.13) –0.078 (–2.18)
Finance, insurance, or real estate –0.134 (–1.11) –0.109 (–1.42) –0.142 (–1.62) –0.118 (–1.21) –0.179 (–1.52)
Transportation or telecommunications –0.085 (–0.88) –0.065 (–1.03) –0.032 (–0.45) –0.093 (–1.17) –0.027 (–0.31)
Occupation dummy (base = laborer)
Expert, engineer, or teacher 0.290 (  4.78) 0.159 (  3.42) 0.231 (  4.79) 0.181 (  3.39) 0.283 (  5.02)
Clerical worker 0.002 (  0.04) 0.046 (  1.49) 0.045 (  1.31) 0.052 (  1.40) 0.037 (  0.92)
Sales or service worker 0.005 (  0.11) 0.044 (  1.36) 0.035 (  0.97) 0.054 (  1.36) 0.028 (  0.66)
Year dummy (base = 1997)
1994 0.012 (  0.27) –0.019 (–0.59) 0.017 (  0.47) –0.041 (–1.05) –0.031 (–0.74)
1995 0.027 (  0.61) 0.040 (  1.34) 0.052 (  1.55) 0.001 (  0.02) –0.005 (–0.13)
1996 0.039 (  0.90) 0.017 (  0.58) 0.015 (  0.46) –0.065 (–1.77) –0.046 (–1.15)
1997 –0.035 (–0.81) –0.057 (–1.84) –0.046 (–1.35) –0.088 (–2.34) –0.085 (–2.12)
Current profit to sales ratio 0.000 (  0.01) 0.000 (  0.01) 0.000 (  0.02) 0.000 (  0.05) 0.000 (  0.01)
CPI by prefecture 0.020 (  5.03) 0.021 (  7.54) 0.020 (  6.57) 0.022 (  6.42) 0.020 (  5.50)
Unemployment rate by region and sex 0.038 (  1.71) 0.031 (  2.07) 0.020 (  1.22) 0.016 (  0.87) 0.033 (  1.66)
    —   —   —   —   —
  ———— ——————
   0.237 (159.92) 0.158 (  71.05) 0.181 (  96.17) 0.199 (117.17) 0.217 (168.53)
 u —— 0.034 (  12.73) 0.024 (  23.04) 0.023 (  19.96) 0.036 (  10.04)
Number of samples 436 436 436 436 436
Log likelihood –105.689 0.976 –24.393 –58.183 –83.850
Probability of wage cuts (percent) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Probability of wage freezes (percent) 62.8 51.7 54.7 57.5 59.7
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